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ABSTRACT
This paper uses an estimated structural model to argue that the option to move in and out of the
parental home is an important insurance channel against labor market risk for youths who do not
attend college. Using data from the NLSY97, I construct a new monthly panel of parent-youth
coresidence outcomes and use it to document an empirical relationship between these movements
and individual labor market events. The data is then used to estimate the parameters of a dynamic
game between youths and their altruistic parents, featuring coresidence, labor supply and savings
decisions. Parents can provide both monetary support through explicit ﬁnancial transfers, and
non-monetary support in the form of shared residence. To account for the data, two types of
exogenous shocks are needed. Preference shocks are found to explain most of the cross-section of
living arrangements, while labor market shocks account for individual movements in and out of the
parental home. I use the model to show that coresidence is a valuable form of insurance, particularly
for youths from poorer families. The option to live at home also helps to explain features of aggregate
data for low-skilled young workers: their low savings rates and their relatively small consumption
responses to labor market shocks. An important implication is that movements in and out of home
can reduce the consumption smoothing beneﬁts of social insurance programs.
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PhD dissertation at New York University. I have beneﬁted from participants at seminars and from discussions
with people at numerous institutions that are too numerous to mention. The views expressed herein are those
of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve
System.1 Introduction
For many young people, the passage out of the parental home is a prolonged, transitional phase,
in which they alternate between periods of living at home and living independently.1 Throughout
this phase, young workers face substantial risk in the labor market, yet make minimal use of
traditional insurance mechanisms. Low-skilled youths have very little personal wealth, poor
access to credit markets, receive only small amounts of direct ﬁnancial assistance from family
members and are often not eligible for beneﬁts from social insurance programs. This paper uses
an estimated structural model to account for observed coresidence dynamics and to argue that
the option to move in and out of home is a valuable mechanism for insuring against labor market
risk, substituting for more traditional insurance channels for young workers.
The use of coresidence as insurance turns out to have important implications. On the
positive side, it helps explain otherwise puzzling aspects of youths’ economic behavior: their
relatively small consumption responses to labor market shocks and their low savings rates. On
the normative side, the option to live at home can reduce the consumption smoothing beneﬁts of
social insurance programs for youths, suggesting that parental coresidence should be considered
when assessing the welfare gains of interventions targeted at young workers.
I start by constructing a new monthly panel dataset of parent-youth coresidence outcomes
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97), and use it to document several
new facts about the living arrangements of 16 to 23 year-old males who do not go to college.
Over this age range, the fraction of youths living independently from their parents increases
sharply. However, it is also common for youths to move back home - over 40% of male youths
who lived away from home, were also observed to move back home by age 23. Moreover, there is
a direct link between these coresidence movements and labor market events. In Kaplan (2009a)
I use the same panel dataset to estimate a series of duration models for movements in and out of
home and show that the hazard of moving back home is signiﬁcantly increased for youths who
have recently stopped working.2
In light of this evidence, this paper asks three questions: (i) To what extent do labor market
shocks account for observed patterns of parental coresidence? (ii) What is the value of the option
to move in and out of home as a channel of insurance and how does this aﬀect the value of social
insurance programs? and (iii) How does coresidence aﬀect young males’ savings behavior?
1A substantial body of anecdotal evidence and reports in the popular press suggest a recent trend in the USA
for young people to move back home with their parents after a period of living away from home. This has led to
the coining of the term ‘Boomerang Kids’ to describe this group. See Section 2 and Kaplan (2009a) for empirical
evidence on the extent of these movements in and out of home for low-skilled youth.
2For male youths who do not go to college, the monthly hazard of moving back home is decreased by 34%
if a youth is currently employed, and is increased by 64% if a youth has recently stopped work. There is also
evidence to support a link between parent-youth living arrangements and labor-market outcomes at the aggregate
level. Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) show that over the last 30 years, the fraction of 16to
30 year-olds who live with their parents decreases substantially during booms and increases during recessions.
Details available from author upon request.
1To answer these questions, the paper proceeds by estimating the structural parameters of
a dynamic model of labor supply, savings, coresidence and transfer decisions. The structure
of the model is a dynamic game between youths and parents. Parents, who are altruistic, can
provide both monetary support through explicit ﬁnancial transfers, and non-pecuniary support,
in the form of shared residence. The beneﬁts of shared residence accrue from a reduction in per-
capita direct housing costs and the availability of public goods inside the parental home. Youths
make labor supply and savings decisions, in addition to a choice about whether or not to live
with their parents. The model assumes that allocations are given by the unique Markov-perfect
equilibrium of this game.
To simultaneously account for the cross-section and time-series dimensions of coresidence and
labor market outcomes in the data, the model requires two types of idiosyncratic uncertainty.
The ﬁrst are labor market shocks, that come in the form of job oﬀers, job losses, promotions and
changes in productivity. These shocks generate a motive for moving in and out of home, since
the housing decision and the labor market are tied together through a budget constraint. The
strength of this link depends on the extent to which parents are willing and able to provide direct
ﬁnancial support to youths. In addition, coresidence can be used to insure against the impact
of adverse labor market events. The second type of uncertainty is time-varying heterogeneity
in youths’ relative desire to live away from their parents. This reﬂects non-labor market events
such as ﬁnding a partner. The stochastic structure of these shocks is ﬂexible enough so that in
principle, all coresidence movements could be generated by preference heterogeneity alone.
Importantly, the model is stylized enough to render structural estimation feasible, with all
key parameters pinned down by the available data. The estimated model is able to account
for all the salient dimensions of the data. In particular, I am able to identify the unobserved
process for preference shocks: these are estimated to be very persistent but with a large amount
of cross-sectional heterogeneity. This implies that the extent to which labor-market shocks
account for coresidence patterns depends on whether one looks at the cross-section of living
arrangements or the within-individual time-series of living arrangements. Whereas only around
15% of cross-sectional diﬀerences are accounted for by labor market outcomes, around 38% of
movements out of and 50% of movements into the parental home are driven by events in the
labor market. This is an important distinction - it implies that the importance of parental
coresidence as an insurance channel would be overlooked if one were to restrict attention to
cross-sectional regressions or a static structural model.
I then use the model to measure the value of diﬀerent insurance channels. To do this, I
compare the welfare cost of a job loss, expressed in terms of a compensating asset transfer,
with the corresponding welfare cost when a particular insurance channel is removed. Measured
this way, I ﬁnd that the option to move in and out of home is valuable for all youths, but
particularly so for youths from poor families. This is because parents from the lower part of the
income distribution ﬁnd it more costly to substitute ﬁnancial transfers for coresidence, when
2the option to move back home is removed. For an average 21 year-old youth from the bottom
quartile of the parental income distribution, removal of the option to move back home increases
the cost of a job loss by a factor of 6, compared with a factor of 1.7 for the removal of a
simple unemployment insurance system. Conversely, for a youth from the top quartile of the
parental distribution, it is ﬁnancial transfers from parents rather than coresidence that is the
most important form of insurance.
Identifying the quantitatively important insurance channels for diﬀerent subgroups of the
population is an important economic goal for at least two reasons. First, the welfare implications
of redistributive policy interventions depend crucially on the extent to which policies crowd out
private transfers that take place within the family. This paper shows that a key component of
these private transfers is coresidence, particularly for low-skilled youths from poor backgrounds.
Hence ignoring youths’ option to live with their parents can potentially lead to a mistaken
assessment of the value of social-insurance programs for young workers. I provide an example of
the potential for such eﬀects in Section 6, where I compare the estimated consumption-smoothing
beneﬁts of unemployment insurance in an environment where coresidence is ignored, with the
estimated beneﬁts when it is modeled. I ﬁnd that the average drop in consumption due to the
loss of a job is increased by 9 percentage points when the level of unemployment beneﬁts is
halved and there is no option to live at home. However, when there is an option to live at home,
halving the level of unemployment beneﬁts increases this average consumption drop by only 3
percentage points.
Second, studying the way that people smooth shocks sheds light on other aspects of their
behavior. For young males, I ﬁnd this to be especially important with respect to savings.
In an inﬂuential paper, Hubbard et al. (1995) argued that asset-based, means-tested social
insurance, such as that implicit in the US welfare system, can have distortionary eﬀects on
savings behavior by discouraging households to accumulate their own precautionary wealth. I
ﬁnd that a similar eﬀect operates for young males through the implicit insurance provided by
parents. When support from parents is restricted, asset accumulation increases substantially:
without coresidence, average assets are 4% higher at age 23 than in the baseline environment and
42% higher without ﬁnancial transfers. Note that a key contribution of the paper is to highlight
the fact that the option to move back home can have important behavioral implications for
youths living at home or away, even if they never actually experience such a move. Simply
knowing that this opportunity exists, causes youths to modify their savings decisions.
Because it focuses explicitly on the experiences of young men, this paper is admittedly less
general than other studies of insurance mechanisms.3 However by focusing on a particular group
3In fact, the estimation restricts attention to youths who do not go to college - around one half of the relevant
population. However, this is partly due to limited data availability on coresidence for youths who go to college.
Moreover, almost all of the anecdotal evidence in the popular press about movements back home refer to college
graduates. Hence the importance of these movements in the current study is likely a lower bound on the importance
of allowing for these movements in the entire youth population.
3of individuals, the paper makes a point that is overlooked by much of the existing literature on
risk-sharing: even if the overall insurability of shocks is the same for diﬀerent parts of the popula-
tion, the particular mechanisms that implement this level of consumption smoothing may diﬀer
markedly across sub-groups. Moreover, the recent ﬁndings in Kaplan and Violante (2010) sug-
gest that young households with low wealth are exactly the group whose insurance mechanisms
are least understood. Kaplan and Violante (2010) compute the amount of consumption insur-
ance implicit in a calibrated incomplete-markets lifecycle economy where self-insurance through
borrowing and savings is the only private insurance channel. When compared with correspond-
ing estimates from US data in Blundell et al. (2008), it is found to be young households for
whom the hypothesis of self-insurance alone is most at odds with the data. This paper argues
that parental coresidence is an important component of this additional consumption smoothing.
Connections to Existing Literature The idea that families have an important role to
play in smoothing the impact of economic shocks dates back at least as far as the seminal work
of Becker (1974) and has been investigated empirically by Hayashi et al. (1996). More recently,
a growing body of work has recognized that an important component of intra-family support
comes in the form of coresidence.4 However, this literature has largely restricted attention
to the provision of support after retirement and into old-age. For example, Bethencourt and
Rios-Rull (2007) and Pezzin et al. (2007) examine various modes of interaction that determine
living arrangements of elderly parents, and Costa (1999) studies the interaction between public-
assistance programs and these living arrangements.
The existing literature on coresidence at the beginning, rather than the end, of the working
life - between young adults and their parents - is largely empirical in nature. It has focussed
on comparing the family and individual characteristics of youths living at home versus youths
living away from home. In the economics literature, prominent examples are McElroy (1985),
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994), Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997),
Ermisch (1999) and Manacorda and Moretti (2006). In the sociology literature examples include
Goldscheider and Goldscheider (1999) and Buck and Scott (1993).
By studying the insurance value of parental coresidence, this paper advances a research
agenda initiated in part by the ﬁndings in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1994). Their results indicate that coresidence is indeed a common form of assistance
provided by parents, and suggest that it should be explicitly considered together with ﬁnancial
transfers when analyzing the nature of parent-youth interactions. Although some of these papers
interpret their results within the context of structural models of behavior, few of them estimate
structural parameters.5 One recent paper that does estimate a structural model of coresidence
4For an excellent review of work on the various forms of intergenerational ties in economics, sociology and
psychology see Bianchi et al. (2006).
5Despite the wealth of anecdotal evidence on young people moving back home, this existing empirical literature
has largely restricted attention to cross-sectional patterns of coresidence at a point in time, or the ﬁrst movement
out of the parental home. There are very few empirical analyses of movements back home. Two exceptions from
4is Sakudo (2007), who investigates the decision to move out of home and get married for young
females in Japan.
The work in this paper has strong links to a number of other branches of existing literature.
First it is related to the purely theoretical analyses of youth coresidence in Fogli (2004) and
Fernandes et al. (2008), that allow for expectations about future outcomes to aﬀect current
coresidence decisions. Second, the model builds on a class of models that have incorporated a
savings decision into a labor market search setting, pioneered by Danforth (1979), Lentz and
Tranaes (2005), Lise (2006) and Low et al. (2007). Third, the paper contributes to a line of
literature originally advocated by Deaton and Paxson (1994) that attempts to quantify the
extent to which idiosyncratic shocks are insurable.6 This paper takes a structural approach by
explicitly incorporating an as-yet unstudied channel of insurance that is particularly relevant
around the time of entry to the labor market.7 Finally, it adds to a growing body of evidence
that non-labor market shocks are important for understanding economic outcomes at both an
individual and aggregate level.8
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I describe the data that are
used for estimation and highlight key features of the economic environment for low-skilled male
youths. Section 3 describes the economic environment, and Section 4 outlines the structure
of a non-cooperative repeated game between youths and parents. In Section 5, I present the
estimation strategy, discuss identiﬁcation of the structural parameters, analyze the ﬁt of the
model and evaluate the relative contribution of labor market and preference shocks to coresidence
dynamics. In Section 6 I quantify the value of coresidence as an insurance channel and illustrate
the interaction of parental support with savings behavior. Section 7 concludes.
2 Facts About Coresidence and the Labor Market
In this section I introduce the data that will be used for estimation, and highlight several facts
about the economic environment of young males who do not go to college in the USA.9
Data Source The data come from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97)
and is described in more detail in Appendix A. The NSLY97 is a longitudinal survey of 8,984 in-
the sociology literature are DaVanzo and Goldscheider (1990) who use the 1972 National Longitudinal surveys and
Goldscheider and Goldscheider (1999) who use the National Survey of Families and Households. The only study
of movements back home at a greater frequency than annual, and that links such movements to contemporaneous
events in the labor market is the companion paper Kaplan (2009a).
6Other examples include Attanasio and Davis (1996), Hayashi et al. (1996), Storesletten et al. (2004), Krueger
and Perri (2006), Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan and Violante (2010).
7Other examples of papers that study the eﬀect of ‘real-world’ channels on consumption insurance include
Fern´ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) (durable consumption goods), Low (2005), Kaplan (2007) (variable
labor supply) and Chatterjee et al. (2007) (bankruptcy protection).
8See for example Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (2003).
9In a companion paper, Kaplan (2009a), I provide a more comprehensive empirical analysis. That paper
reports the full results from the estimation of various duration models of the hazard of leaving and returning
home, and includes an analysis for females.
5dividuals from the cohort born between 1980 and 1984. They have been sampled approximately
annually since 1997. The survey contains extensive information on their labor market behav-
ior and educational outcomes, together with detailed information about the youth’s family and
community background. The questions that make the NLSY97 an ideal data set to study the
dynamics of parent-youth living arrangements are a set of retrospective questions about monthly
coresidence that were asked in rounds 2-6 (1998-2002). At each interview, these questions asked
respondents to list each period of one month or more in which they lived separately from each of
their parents.10 From these questions, it is possible to reconstruct a monthly panel of parental
coresidence outcomes for each respondent, which was then merged with data on educational,
labor market and marital histories.
Sample Selection Sample selection poses a challenge for this analysis. First, the fact
that the monthly coresidence questions were discontinued in 2002 restricts the ages at which
it is possible to observe contemporaneous labor market and coresidence outcomes for youths
in the NLSY97. In particular, this means that studying the interaction between labor market
dynamics and coresidence dynamics for youths who go to college is not possible. In this paper,
I thus focus attention on the population of low-skilled youths who do not attend college.11
However, implementing the restriction to the non-college population raises its own chal-
lenges. First, for youths in this age group, the decision about whether to attend post-secondary
education is almost certainly endogenous with respect to labor market opportunities and cores-
idence outcomes. Hence, selecting on the basis of observed education choices may introduce
non-random selection on unobservable characteristics into the sample. Second, many youths
may initially decide to enter the labor market in the years immediately following high school,
but may return to education at some point in the future. Moreover, it is common for youths
to attend non-traditional part-time colleges, a decision that may also be correlated with labor
market opportunities.
My approach is to choose a baseline sample of youths who are never observed to participate in
any type of post-secondary education. Choosing a sample of youths for whom we can condition
on the decision to not attend college allows the focus to be placed clearly on the interaction
between residential movements and labor market events. It seems a natural starting point for
understanding the economic implications of coresidence movements for low-skilled youths and
avoids the complications that arise from the interaction with college choice.
To address the potential concerns regarding endogeneity of the education decision, I also
compare the baseline sample with two alternative samples that implement the restriction to
10A parent is deﬁned in the NLSY97 as a biological, step, adoptive or foster parent. Youths were explicitly
asked to ignore periods of temporary separation from their parents due to summer camp. See Appendix A for
details.
11After 2002 (round 6), the retrospective coresidence questions were replaced with two questions that ask about
the month and year that a youth ﬁrst lived away from his/her parents, and the month and year when he/she
returned home for a period of at least three months. It is possible, as the cohort ages, that these questions could
also be used to study movements back home for college graduates.
6low-skilled youth in diﬀerent ways.12 First, I select on the basis of low test scores, which are
a strong predictor of future college participation. Since selection in this sample is based on a
purely exogenous variable, there are no issues of endogeneity of education. Next, I construct a
less restrictive sample by only dropping youths who are traditional college participants - those
youths who start college immediately after graduating from high school, or within one year of
graduating. The purpose of this last sample is to retain youths who may attend college part-
time. I ﬁnd that both of these alternative samples generate statistics that are very similar to
the baseline sample, indicating that none of the structural estimation results would be severely
aﬀected by selecting low-skilled youths using a diﬀerent criterion.
The other important selection criteria are as follows. Females are dropped, as are males who
ever go to the military or have all parents dead.13 A youth is included in the ﬁnal panel from
the ﬁrst month after he stops attending high school or after he turns 16, whichever is later.
Only youths who have non-missing residence data are included in the ﬁnal sample. The ﬁnal
sample consists of 41,406 month-youth observations, for 1,613 male youths ranging in age from
16 to 23. These generate 427 spells back home, where a spell is deﬁned as one that is not left
censored. Since the NLSY97 has an oversampling of black and hispanic youths, sample weights
are used in all calculations. Table 1 reports the number of respondents lost at each stage of the
selection process. Weighted summary statistics for the ﬁnal sample are shown in Table 2.
Parental Coresidence Figure 1(a) plots the increase in the fraction of the sample living
away from home between ages 16.5 and 22.5. Over these 6 years, this fraction increases roughly
linearly from 21% to 55%, and will presumably continue to increase as the cohort ages.14 How-
ever, it may take some time to reach 100%. Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
and the Current Population Survey suggests that for older cohorts, the fraction of males not
living with their parents plateaus at 90% at around age 40. The fact that even by age 23 nearly
half of the subjects are living with their parents, suggests that a substantial fraction of the
sample may not move out at all during the sample period. This is correct: Table 2 reports that
47% of the sample are observed to live at home throughout the whole sample period.
Moving In and Out of Home The main premise of this paper is that for many youths,
moving out of home is not a one-way transition. Evidence for this can be found in Figure 1(b).
12Results are available from the author on request.
13Focussing exclusively on males avoids modeling complications due to beneﬁt eligibility for young females.
Whereas very few males of this age group receive some form of government support, it is not uncommon for
females to receive beneﬁts. Many such beneﬁts are related to early child-bearing and importantly, eligibility for
certain beneﬁts is conditioned on residential choices. While this is an interesting feature of the beneﬁt system for
females that could be explored in future research, I focus on the simpler case of males in this paper.
14It may appear surprising that the fraction living away from home is positive at age 16.5. This is because the
selection criteria impose that only youths who have already completed their education are included in the sample.
Because the decision to stop school is closely related to the decision to move out of home, a selection eﬀect is
introduced, whereby those youths in the sample at ages 16 and 17 are more likely to be living away than other
males of that age. These are youths that had already ﬁnished school and were living away from home when they
entered the sample.
7The solid blue line shows the fraction of youths of each age who have ever lived away from home
and the dashed red lines shows the corresponding fraction that has ever moved back home. 45%
of all 22.5 year-olds in the sample have moved back home at some point. Of course to move back
home, one has to ﬁrst live away from home, and this number represents 59% of the corresponding
fraction of youths who have ever lived away. Again, the right-censoring of the coresidence panel
prevents us from observing how big this fraction becomes as the cohort ages, but a lower bound
on the fraction of youths who ever move back home of 45% is considerably high, and should
be taken as evidence that movements back to the parental home are a common occurrence for
youths who do not go to college in the USA.15
The fact that the NLSY97 allows for monthly coresidence data to be constructed means that
it is possible to examine the nature of movements in and out of the parental home in more detail
than has been studied in the past.16 The average monthly probability of moving back home
amongst youths living away from home is 3.1%. The corresponding average monthly probability
of moving out of home is 2.9%. These high movement rates further support the notion that
there is a strong dynamic component to parent-youth coresidence.
Figure 1(c) reports the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the empirical survival function for spells
back home. Overall, spells are fairly long, with a median duration of 12 months back home.
However, the survival function also reveals considerable heterogeneity in the duration of spells
back home. Some spells are fairly short: 28% are 6 months or less in duration; yet some spells
are very long: 26% are 2 years or more. Recall that due to the nature of the survey question, a
spell is only included if it is longer than 1 month. It is thus likely (although diﬃcult to conﬁrm)
that there are numerous extremely short spells back home, of less than one month duration, that
are ignored altogether. In addition, a large fraction of spells (59%) are right censored, which
suggests that durations may be even longer than those reported here.
Entering the Labor Market Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show that there is a large amount
of non-stationarity in the earnings and employment for young males who do not go to college
over this age range. The fraction of youths that are working in a given month increases from
around 40% to around 80%. Average monthly earnings, conditional on working in a given month,
approximately doubles, from around $1,500 to around $3,000.17
Unstable Labor Market Young males who do not go to college face considerable instability
in the labor market. Figures 2(c) and 2(d) show the monthly separation rate and survival
15These statistics constitute empirical evidence to support the numerous informal anecdotes in the popular press
about youths moving back home. Examples can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boomerang Generation.
16Having access to monthly data makes it possible to address questions about the length of spells back home,
how the hazard of leaving home again changes with the duration of the spell back home and how the hazards of
moving in and out of home are aﬀected by recent events in the labor market. This is in contrast with existing
empirical studies, which have utilized either annual data or data on single spells away from home. Such studies
include DaVanzo and Goldscheider (1990), Goldscheider and Goldscheider (1999), Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997),
Ermisch (1999), McElroy (1985), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994).
17All currency units reported in the paper are in terms of January 2007 dollars.
8function for spells out of work. Figure 2(c) suggests that jobs are particularly fragile for this
group: the monthly separation rate is around 5%, which translates to an annual rate of over 40%.
Youths also face substantial earnings ﬂuctuations when employed. Conditional on working, the
monthly probability of an earnings change - either through a job change, a wage change on the
job or a change in hours worked - is around 24%. In addition, Figure 2(d) reports that spells
out of work tend to be fairly long. The median duration out of work is 4 months, with a long
right tail. Both a gradual process of attachment to the labor market and high job mobility for
young workers are facts that are consistent with evidence from an earlier cohort, documented
by Topel and Ward (1992).
Coresidence and the Labor Market Figures 2(e) and 2(f) provide a view of how earnings
diﬀer between youths living at home and youths living away. Figure 2(e) plots the average log
monthly earnings of youths away (solid blue line) and youths at home (dashed red line) against
age. There are three things to note. First, the increase in average earnings over this age
range occurs in both residence states. Second, the diﬀerence between earnings at home and
away, conditional on age, is very small. Conditioning on age is important when making this
comparison, since the fact that both earnings and the probability of living away from home
increase with age induces a spurious diﬀerence in the average earnings of those at home and
those away. Third, earnings of youths at home are initially similar to, or slightly above, that of
youths away from home, but this gradually reverses as the group ages. This point can be seen
more clearly in Figure 2(f), which plots the away-home diﬀerence in average log earnings.
It is important to note that the fact that the earnings of youths at home are very similar
to those away from home does not necessarily imply that the labor market is not a driving
force behind coresidence outcomes. The facts in Figure 2 are cross-sectional, whereas in Section
5.3 I will use the estimated model to argue that it is primarily coresidence movements that
are related to labor market outcomes. To provide some direct evidence for this hypothesis, I
calculate the average monthly probabilities of moving in and out of home by labor market status.
The monthly probability of moving back home is higher for youths who are not working than for
youths who are (3.7% compared with 2.8%). Similarly, the probability of leaving home is higher
for working youths than non-working youths (3.0% compared with 2.6%). In Kaplan (2009a) I
estimate a series of duration models and show that the relationship between labor market events
and the probability of moving back home is strong and signiﬁcant even once other characteristics
are controlled for. I ﬁnd that the monthly hazard of moving back home is 34% lower when a
youth is working and 64% higher if the youth stopped work in the previous month.
Assets I focus on two measures of wealth: net ﬁnancial assets and net ﬁnancial assets plus
net value of cars. These measures can be constructed using annual data for a subset of youths
from ages 17 to 20.18 Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show that youths in the sample hold very little
18See the appendix for further details on the availability of wealth data in the NLSY97 and the construction of
asset variables.
9wealth. A large proportion of youths actually hold no assets at all. For ﬁnancial assets, this
fraction decreases from 72% to 41% between ages 17 and 20. When cars are included these
fractions drop to 53% and 27%. Nonetheless, for those youths with non-zero wealth, average
assets increase modestly between the ages of 17 and 20 - from $650 to $1,600 for ﬁnancial assets,
and from $1,750 to $4,600 when cars are included.
Financial Transfers from Parents Figures 3(c) and 3(d) report statistics on the extent
of annual ﬁnancial transfers from parents to youths.19 Although around one third of subjects
reported receiving ﬁnancial support from their parents in a given year, the reported amounts
are low. Conditional on receiving a positive transfer, the overall mean and median amounts
are approximately $1,100 and $470 respectively. However, it is important to view the data
on transfer amounts with caution for two reasons. First, recall bias may lead to substantial
under-reporting of cash transfers during a given year. This is particularly true if transfers are
made as irregular small amounts over the course of the year, rather than in a single lump sum.
Second, it is likely that a large fraction of transfers from parents to children are not made in
cash. Transfers often result from either purchasing goods directly (such as meals or clothing)
or through in-kind transfers (such as the use of the family car). For these reasons, I focus
exclusively on the fraction of youths that receive a transfer, rather than the amount of transfers,
when estimating the model, and view the data on transfer amounts as underestimates of true
ﬁnancial transfers.
Summary of Key Facts The facts documented in this section highlight some of the deﬁn-
ing features of the economic environment for young males who do not go to college in the USA.
We have seen that over the age range 16 to 23: (i) the fraction of youths living away from
their parents increases with age; (ii) transitions in and out of the parental home are common;
(iii) non-working youths are more likely to move back home than working youths; (iv) employ-
ment increases substantially with age, as does earnings when employed; (v) the labor market is
unstable and separation rates are high; (vi) the away-home diﬀerence in earnings is small and
increases with age; (vii) youths hold very small amounts of ﬁnancial wealth; (viii) around one
third of youths receive ﬁnancial transfers from their parents.
3 A Model of Coresidence, Labor Supply and Savings
I now present a model that is rich enough to account for these facts, yet places enough structure
on the data to enable estimation of the key parameters governing coresidence, labor supply and
transfers decisions. In this section, I outline the physical environment and the set of feasible
allocations.20
19See Appendix A for details on the construction of transfer variables.
20In Appendix B, I describe a simpliﬁed static version of the model which admits a closed-form solution and is
useful for demonstrating some of the key mechanisms that are at work.
10Demographics Time is discrete and measured in months. I focus on the ﬁnite horizon
t = 0,1...T. The basic unit in the model is a family, which consists of a parent-youth pair.
Families are indexed by j, and each comprises a parent (p) and a youth (y). In any month, t,
the family can be in one of two residential states, labelled rjt ∈ {0,1}. When rjt = 0 the youth
lives in the parental home and when rjt = 1 the youth lives in separate housing away from his
parents.
Youth Preferences Youths have time-separable, expected-utility preferences, deﬁned over
consumption, labor supply and the residence state. Let U
y
jt denote the period utility for a youth











− hjtv + rjtzjt (1)
Period utility is additively separable between utility from consumption, labor supply and direct
utility from independence. There are two types of consumption goods. c
y
jt is the youth’s con-
sumption of a private good, enjoyed exclusively by the youth. G = g
y
jt + (1 − rjt)g
p
jt is total
consumption of a locally public good inside the home. It consists of the youth’s own purchases
of the good, g
y
jt, as well as public consumption purchased by the parent that is available inside
the parental home, g
p
jt. Of course, the youth only has access to this second quantity of the public
good if he lives at home, i.e. rjt = 0.
In reality, most types of consumption fall somewhere in between these two extremes: a
completely non-rival and non-excludable good (g) and a fully private good (c). The extent to
which there exists economies of scale in the parental home, or in other words, the extent to which
most consumption is like g rather than c is a key determinant of the value of coresidence and the
impact of coresidence on behavior. The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation allows for a parameter φ (the
weight on public goods in the utility function) that indexes this extent. When φ = 1, only public
goods are consumed and there are full economies of scale, when φ = 0, all consumption is private
and there are no economies of scale. In section 5.1, I use data on consumption equivalence scales
to calibrate a value for φ.21 I assume a CRRA utility function over the composite consumption
good, with risk aversion γ.
The value of living away from home, zjt, is stochastic and diﬀers across youths. In any
month, a youth can be either working, hjt = 1, or not working, hjt = 0. The disutility of
















T+1 is a terminal value function described below.
21In a previous version of this paper, Kaplan (2009b), I speciﬁed the parameter φ as part of the budget
constraint, rather than as a preference parameter. In that version, I estimated the model under the two extreme
(and unrealistic) cases of no economies of scale (φ = 0) and full economies of scale (φ = 1). In these two extreme
cases, that formulation is equivalent to the one adopted here.
11Preference shocks, zjt, are assumed to follow a discrete-state Markov process in logs whose
variance, σ2
z, and auto-correlation, ρz, are constant with age. The preference shocks play an
important role in the model and should be interpreted as a reduced-form way of capturing the
eﬀects of non-labor market heterogeneity in the relative preference for living away from home.
Such shocks may include the formation and dissolution of cohabiting relationships, peer eﬀects
and changes in the demographic structure of the parental home. In reality, these eﬀects are
likely to exhibit an increasing trend with age, making living away from home an increasingly
attractive option for young adults as they get older. For example, independence from one’s
parents is itself something that becomes more attractive as youths move towards adulthood. To
capture this feature of coresidence, the mean relative preference for living away from home (in
levels), E [zt] = αz + βzt, is allowed to increase exogenously according to a linear trend.
It will become apparent that the model features a number of endogenous mechanisms for
generating the observed increase in the fraction of youths living away from home between the
ages of 16 and 23, all related to the labor market experience of youths.22 If E [zt] were assumed
to remain constant with age, the model would risk assigning an overly important role to the
labor market in determining coresidence patterns. By allowing for ﬂexibility in the mean growth,
variance and autocorrelation of z, the model is such that in principle, either labor market or non-
labor market factors could be the primary driver of coresidence outcomes. The features of the
data that help identify these parameters, and hence distinguish between these two hypotheses,
are discussed in Section 5.2.
Parent Preferences Parents have time-separable expected utility preferences and are al-
truistic towards their children. They have direct preferences over their own private consumption,
c
p
















Their total utility,23 V
p
0 , consists of their direct utility, e V
p
0 , plus the utility of their child, V
y
0 ,
weighted with an altruism factor, η ≥ 0 :
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This form of one-sided altruism has a long history in the modeling of parent-child interactions
and has a number of implications for behavior.24 First, altruism is the mechanism that is used
22These mechanisms include: (i) an increasing probability of working; (ii) an increasing earnings proﬁle condi-
tional on working; and (iii) asset accumulation.
23Note that this formulation of preferences implies that parents do not get utility from public consumption
purchased by the youth (g
y
jt) when the youth lives at home. This asymmetry is unlikely to have any meaningful
eﬀect on allocations because in most cases the youth does not make additional purchases of public consumption
when living at home.
24See for example, Altonji et al. (1997) and references therein.
12to generate ﬁnancial transfers from parental to youths. Second, note that when zjt > 0, both
parents and youths have a preference for the youth to live away. However, since in general η < 1,
parents have a weaker direct preference for youths to live away than do youths themselves. This
conﬂict may manifest itself in the form of multiple equilibria of a simultaneous-move version
of the game described in Section 4, and motivates the need to specify an appropriate timing
protocol for the game. Altruism also implies that parents have a stronger preference for youths
to work at a given wage, generating a second form of conﬂict. Both forms of conﬂict can generate
ineﬃciencies, which are discussed in Appendix D.25
Youth Budget Constraint In each period, a youth can be in one of two labor market
states: employed (hjt = 1) or non-employed (hjt = 0). An employed youth earns an idiosyncratic
monthly wage wjt, which is the outcome of a stochastic process, outlined in the section below on
the labor market. A non-employed youth without an oﬀer to work receives an exogenous amount
b. This should be interpreted as the beneﬁt from a simple public unemployment insurance
program. Labor income taxes are levied according to the function τ.26





and to invest in a risk-free asset, aj,t+1 which earns interest at a gross rate R.27 In addition,
a youth may receive a transfer Tjt ≥ 0 from his parents. There is a per-period ﬁxed monthly
cost of housing, χ, payable by youths living away from home and a ﬁxed cost κ of moving out
of home. The per-period cost is meant to capture both direct housing costs such as rent and
mortgage payments, as well as indirect costs such as gas and electricity bills. The ﬁxed cost of
moving out is intended to capture direct moving costs as well as indirect costs that may include
purchases of new furniture and other durable consumption goods. There is no ﬁxed cost for










jt + aj,t+1 −χ − κ(1 − rj,t−1) ≤ wjthjt − τ (wjthjt) + b(1 − hjt) + Rajt +Tjt
(4)
Parent Budget Constraints Parents have an exogenous constant income stream, I
p
j , which
diﬀers across families.28 Parental income can be used to purchase private consumption goods,
25Altruism is the mechanism that is used to generate ﬁnancial transfers from parents to youths in the model.
However when youth and parents have identical homothetic preferences over consumption, altruism places a
strong restriction on the relationship between parental income and ﬁnancial transfers. In particular, transfers
are approximately linear in parental income (exactly linear in a static version of the model), which is at odds
with the data, if the transfer data are taken at face value. This issue is discussed further and possible alternative
formulations that relax this relationship are suggested in Section 5.3.
26The monthly wages from the NLSY97 which are used in the estimation of the model are gross of labor income
taxes, which necessitates the inclusion of a tax function in the model. The assumed tax function is based on the
US tax system in 2007 and is described in Appendix A.
27I assume that youths do not have the ability to borrow so aj,t+1 ≥ 0.
28The assumption that parental income is constant could be relaxed without any additional diﬃculty. It is
retained to allow the focus to be placed clearly on the interaction of coresidence and labor market shocks for




jt, and public consumption goods, g
p
jt.29 In addition, parents can make non-negative ﬁnancial














Resource Sharing Across Generations To understand the mechanisms in the model
for sharing resources across generations, it is worth taking stock of the various technologies for
transferring utility from parents to youths. The model features two forms of parental support:
coresidence and ﬁnancial transfers. For a youth living away from his parents, ﬁnancial transfers
are the only means that parents have to share resources: providing an additional unit of assets
to the youth requires the parent to forgo one unit of current period consumption.30
Coresidence is also a technology for intergenerational transfers. To use it requires a ﬁxed
monthly cost through forgone utility from independence (z). The return from paying this utility
cost comprises two parts. First, there is a ﬁxed monthly beneﬁt from the savings in housing
costs (χ). Second, coresidence reduces the cost of transferring additional units of resources from
parents to youths, through the presence of the public good. The extent of this ‘cost-saving’
beneﬁt of coresidence is determined by the weight on public goods in the utility function, φ,
which in this setting plays the role of economies of scale. Conditional on living at home, the
marginal cost for the parent of providing an additional unit of resources to the youth is increasing
in φ and approaches zero as φ approaches one (full economies of scale).
Note also that the only component of coresidence that does not enter through consumption
is the forgone utility from independence when living at home (z). With decreasing marginal
utility, this component dominates as consumption increases, implying that z becomes relatively
more important (and hence coresidence less attractive) as the youth’s assets increase.
Labor Market Search There are two labor market states: employment and non-employment.
Labor market shocks are assumed to be realized at the beginning of each period. I thus describe
the structure of the labor market from the vantage point of a youth’s labor market status in
the previous period. At the beginning of month t, a youth who was not working in month t− 1
receives an oﬀer to work with probability λ0. Oﬀers are assumed to be drawn from a lognormal
distribution
logwjt ∼ N (µ0t,σ0)
29The assumption that parents do not borrow or save is not innocuous. It implies that ﬁnancial transfers to
youths aﬀect parental consumption in the period that they are made and cannot be spread over future periods.
This limits the extent to which parents will use ﬁnancial transfers to oﬀset the eﬀects of labor market shocks to
the youths, relative to a case where parents could use their own savings to smooth the impact of ﬁnancial transfers
on their own consumption. However, relaxing this assumption would introduce an additional continuous state
variable and signiﬁcantly complicate computation and estimation of the model.
30Because a non-resident youth’s savings and/or labor supply decision may adjust in response to a transfer from
the parent, the cost to the parent of providing a unit of consumption to a non-resident youth may be diﬀerent
from 1. The actual cost is given by
∂cy
∂a where a is the resources of the youth.
14where µ0t = µ0 + µgt so that the mean oﬀer distribution is allowed to drift upwards with age,
reﬂecting general experience eﬀects. A youth who receives an oﬀer may accept it and work in
period t, or reject it and hope to receive another oﬀer in month t+1. At the beginning of month
t, a youth who worked in month t − 1 at a wage wj,t−1 will ﬁnd himself in one of three possible
situations:
1. With probability δ the job is exogenously destroyed. A youth who loses his job in this way
must spend period t not working ⇒ hjt = 0.
2. With probability λ1 the youth receives a new wage draw. Conditional on such a wage
change, wages are assumed to follow a random walk in logs with drift.
logwjt = µd + logwj,t−1 + εjt
εjt ∼ N (0,σ1)
Note that the youth has the option of rejecting the new wage oﬀer in favor of non-
employment. In this case the youth spends period t not working. However, the youth
does not have the option of staying at his current job at his existing wage: these wage
shocks are intended to be a reduced-form way of capturing both ﬂuctuations in the quality
of worker-ﬁrm matches, and new job oﬀers that arise from on-the-job search. µd will be es-
timated to be close to zero but positive, implying that on average, on-the-job wage shocks
represent good news, and youths face upward sloping expected earnings proﬁles (returns
to tenure). However, there is some risk attached to a wage change, as new wages may be
below existing wages. This feature is necessary to produce the non-negligible numbers of
downward earnings movements that are observed in the data, without intervening periods
of non-employment.31
3. With probability 1−δ−λ1 there is no change in the youth’s current wage oﬀer. The youth
can choose to either continue to work at this wage (hjt = 1) or quit to the not working
state (hjt = 0).
The labor market described here incorporates two types of risk, productivity and employ-
ment.32 Note that conditional on remaining employed, all shocks to wages are permanent. The
model also incorporates an option value to search, since not all new wage draws while working
result in wage increases, and new draws cannot be rejected in favor of the current wages. The
equilibrium of the game between youths and parents will thus feature reservation wages that are
a function of all the state variables.
31Nagypal (2005) provides evidence for these type of job transitions. The literature on labor market search has
suggested other mechanisms to rationalize this sort of behavior. See for example Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002).
32This is in the spirit of much of the search literature, including Low et al. (2007) who attempt to evaluate the
relative importance of each type of risk over the life-cycle.
15Using data on wages and employment alone, situations 2 and 3 above, when combined
with a quit, cannot be empirically distinguished from job destruction. Together with the fact
that rejected oﬀers to the non-employed are not observed, this implies that the labor market
parameters cannot be estimated outside the model in a ﬁrst stage and fed into the structural
model. Instead they must be estimated along with the other structural parameters inside the
model. The parametric assumptions on the distribution of shocks help to achieve identiﬁcation.33
Without loss of generality we can deﬁne wjt = 0 as the state in which a youth does not
have an oﬀer to work at time t. Deﬁned in this way the history wt
j completely deﬁnes the labor
market outcomes for youth j.34
Government Insurance In the NSLY97 sample described in section 2, 17% of male youths
received a government beneﬁt at some point during their time in the sample. With the exception
of unemployment beneﬁts which are received by 6% of the sample, these are all means-tested
beneﬁts.35 Following Hubbard et al. (1995), I model means-tested beneﬁts as a consumption
ﬂoor, c. Hubbard et al. (1995) show that allowing for the eﬀects of means-tested beneﬁts is
important in understanding savings behavior of poor households. Unemployment beneﬁts, b,
are modeled as a constant beneﬁt that is paid automatically to youths in any period that they
do not have an oﬀer to work. The tax function, described in Appendix A, is progressive and as
such is an additional form of government insurance.
Initial Conditions A complete description of the model also requires speciﬁcation of initial
conditions for assets, residence and labor market variables. Youths are assumed to have a0 = 0
at age 16. This a reasonable assumption given the large fraction of youths with exactly zero
assets reported in Section 2. All youths are assumed to be living at home at t = −1.36 An
exogenous fraction of youths are assumed to have been working at t = −1, and their wages are
given by the observed distribution of monthly earnings at age 16.
Terminal Value Functions Because of the monthly frequency of the model, it is not
computationally feasible to solve and estimate the model using a horizon T that corresponds
to the end of the lifecycle. Moreover, because our interest is in producing a good model of
high-frequency behavior around the time of entry to the labor market, it is not clear that
this would be a preferred approach even if it were computationally feasible, given the inherent
danger of misspeciﬁcation in any model of behavior. Instead I choose to specify terminal value
functions and solve backwards from these. In order to minimize the impact of assumptions
33Identiﬁcation of the labor market and other parameters is discussed further in Section 5.2.
34However, note that wjt is not a ﬁrst-order Markov process since the distribution of wjt conditional on wj,t−1,
depends also on hj,t−1, which is an endogenous variable.
35Means-tested beneﬁts include Food Stamps (FS), Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
Women, Infants, Children (WIC). WIC is the most common (received by 8% of the sample). This is surprising
because it is intended only for females. 90% of these recipients are in a cohabiting relationship, suggesting that
respondents report beneﬁts received by all members of the household.
36Note that this only places a minimal exogenous structure on r0, which is due to the ﬁxed cost of moving out.
Since r0 is itself a choice variable, youths are free to move out in the ﬁrst model period.
16about functional form, I solve the model for an additional two years (24 periods) past the point
at which I have data.37
The assumption at t = T is that the interaction between parents and youths ceases and no
more ﬁnancial transfers can be made. At this point, all youths still living at home are forced
to move out, labor supply becomes inelastic and there is no further uncertainty about future
wages. These assumptions are suﬃcient to obtain closed-form solutions for the value functions,
which are then used as the terminal functions.38
Feasible Allocations Consider stochastic processes for labor market variables (wt) and
preference shocks (zt), and an exogenously given interest rate, R, and cost of housing, χ. An
allocation in this environment, s, is a sequence of functions that map histories of labor market
outcomes and preference shocks,
￿
wt,zt￿
, initial conditions {a0,w−1,h−1,r−1} and heterogeneity








t ,Tt,at+1}. An allocation is feasible
if it satisﬁes the parental budget constraint (5), the youth budget constraint (4) and the non-
negativity constraints for transfers, assets and consumption. Denote the set of feasible allocations
by S.
4 A Non-Cooperative Repeated Game
Markov Perfect Equilibrium There are a number of reasonable ways in which allocations
could be determined in this environment. As a benchmark case, I consider a decentralized
approach without commitment, whereby an equilibrium concept and a timing protocol are spec-
iﬁed, and parents and youths make strategic decisions to maximize their expected discounted
lifetime welfare. In Appendix D, I compare the estimated allocations to those from an alternate
environment with full commitment, where attention is restricted to the subset of S which is
Pareto-eﬃcient between youths and parents, taking prices and stochastic processes as given.
There I give arguments to support the decentralized approach without commitment as the pre-
ferred modeling choice.
The environment described in Section 3 has a natural interpretation as a stochastic repeated
game in which action sets in the stage game are conditioned on a pay-oﬀ relevant state vector
consisting of the current asset position, at, the residence state in the previous period, rt−1, and
the realized values of the two shocks (wt,zt).39 In each repetition of the stage game, the youth
chooses whether to reside at home or away, whether to work and how much to save and purchase
37All results are unchanged when the model is solved with an additional 10 years (120 months).
38An alternative approach would be to specify the terminal value functions as unknown parametric functions of
the state variables, and to estimate these functions along with the other structural parameters. For this approach
to be feasible, it is necessary to have high quality data on the state variables in the ﬁnal period. However after age
20, asset information in recent waves of the NLSY97 is only collected every 5 years, and hence is only available
for a subset of the sample at age 23. Moreover, even with this asset information, it is unlikely that identiﬁcation
of the terminal value functions could be achieved without additional assumptions about functional forms.
39The previous period’s residence outcome, rt−1, is included in the state vector as a result of the ﬁxed cost, κ,
of moving out. If there were no ﬁxed cost it would not be a pay-oﬀ relevant variable.
17of each type of consumption good. The parent chooses monetary transfers to be paid to the
youth, and how to split his income between public and private consumption in the household
if the youth lives at home. The distribution of (wt+1,zt+1) is determined by (ht,wt,zt). The
equilibrium concept that I propose is a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in which all actions
are conditioned on only pay-oﬀ relevant variables, xt = (at,rt−1,wt,zt).40 The structure of the
game is summarized in Table 3.
Timing of Stage Game In order to guarantee uniqueness of the MPE, I impose a particular
extensive form of the stage game which speciﬁes the order in which parents and youths make
their decisions. Attention is then restricted to the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium of
this sequential stage game. The assumed timing is as follows. First, the current state xt =
(at,rt−1,wt,zt) is observed. Then the youth chooses whether to live at home or away (rt). Next,
the parent chooses monetary transfers, Tt, and public consumption (g
y
t ). Finally, the youth





sequence of the stage game is illustrated in Figure 4.
The reason for specifying a timing protocol for the stage game is that the simultaneous-
move version may contain multiple Nash equilibria. This is most easily demonstrated in the
one-shot static version of the game with exogenous labor supply in Appendix B. The intuition
for the appearance of multiple equilibria is that due to imperfect altruism (η < 1) parents have
a weaker direct preference for the youth to live away from home than does the youth. This
generates values for preferences, z, such that the youth prefers an equilibrium in which he lives
away and receives the resulting optimal transfer, while the parent prefers an equilibrium in which
the youth is induced to stay at home by the (non-credible) threat of low transfers if he were to
move out. However with the assumed timing protocol, these latter equilibria are not sub-game
perfect and are ruled out.
This particular timing protocol is motivated in part by casual observation of the way that
these interactions take place in reality. It seems reasonable that parents cannot force youths to
adhere to a particular consumption/savings policy or labor supply decision rule. Rather, they
can only inﬂuence these choices through their choice of ﬁnancial transfers. Similarly, a youth
cannot be forced to stay in the parental home if he wants to move out, but must accept whatever
resulting transfer the parent decides to make. What he does with that transfer is up to him.
In Appendix C I show how the MPE can be described by a set of Bellman equations. For
future reference, it is useful to deﬁne Yt (xt) and Pt (xt) as the continuation value functions for
youths and parents along the equilibrium path, and ˜ Pt (xt) as the corresponding value from
direct utility for parents. Hence Pt (xt) = ˜ Pt (xt) + ηYt (xt).
40Due to the ﬁnite horizon and the fact that the adopted timing protocol guarantees a unique sub-game
perfect equilibrium in the stage game, the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium is also the unique sub-game perfect
equilibrium of the dynamic game. Moreover, I show in Appendix D that at the estimated parameters, the values
from the game lie close to the Pareto frontier. Hence considering alternative timing protocols might lead to
diﬀerent equilibria, but not to more eﬃcient ones.
18Determinants of Coresidence and Transfers There is no analytic solution to this game,
hence the MPE must be computed numerically by backward induction. Nonetheless, a number of
features of the determinants of transfers and coresidence can be described qualitatively. There
are four features of the model that help to generate an increasing fraction of youths living
away from home: (i) an increasing earnings proﬁle; (ii) an increasing probability of employment
through search; (ii) asset accumulation; and (iv) an increasing preference for living away from
home. Youths are more likely to live away from home when earnings, assets or the value of
independence is higher. However, the probability of living away from home is ambiguous with
respect to parental income. On the one hand, higher parental income generates higher parental
transfers and hence a lower earnings/assets threshold for the youth to live away. On the other
hand, higher parental income means higher consumption in the parental home, making living at
home a more attractive option for the youth.
There are two distinct classes of reasons why a youth may move back home: (i) economic
factors that include job loss, wage drops, lower than expected earnings growth and asset de-
cumulation; and (ii) preference shocks (z). However the dynamics of coresidence outcomes for
these two types of shocks are likely to be diﬀerent. Because of the ability to run down assets, a
labor market shock may lead to a move back in a subsequent period, rather than in the same
period in which the shock occurred. However preference shocks, if they lead to a move back
home, are likely to do so in the current period, provided the shocks are suﬃciently persistent.
Parental transfers are characterized by equating their marginal value and marginal cost along
the equilibrium path. When the youth lives away from home, the marginal cost of additional
transfer is the reduction in the value of current period consumption for parents. The marginal
beneﬁt comprises both the marginal value of assets for youths (scaled by the altruism factor),
plus the marginal beneﬁt to parents of higher assets for the youth, that accrues from lower




















Tjt = 0 if inequality is strict. (7)
where ˜ φ = [(1−φ)1−φφφ]
1−γ , Y 4





is the parent’s expected next period direct value function, taking into
account the optimal savings and labor supply decision of the youth. It is straightforward to
see that other things equal, parental transfers are decreasing in youth assets, earnings and
employment, and increasing in parental income.
When the youth lives at home, the parent’s problem is complicated by the fact that the
youth will beneﬁt from any funds spent on the public consumption good. However, if the youth’s
41See Appendix C for a precise deﬁnition of Y
4
t . This is the youths’ value function along the equilibrium path,
just prior to the labor supply and savings decision.




t ) is at an interior point, then it is
always optimal for the parent to set Tt = 0. To see this, note that the parent could always obtain
a higher pay-oﬀ by spending marginal funds on public consumption, g
p
t, rather than transfers,
Tt. That way, the parent gets positive utility from additional current consumption while the
youth can cut back on his own expenditures on g
y
t and so is unaﬀected. In other words, parental
spending on public consumption crowds out the youth’s spending on current consumption one-
for-one. On the other hand, if the youth’s optimal choice for public consumption is at the corner
(g
y
t = 0), then it may be optimal for the parent to make positive ﬁnancial transfers even when
the youth lives at home.
5 Parameter Estimation
5.1 Estimation Strategy
For certain parameters structural estimation inside the model is less crucial than others. As
such, the estimation approach involves ﬁxing some parameters exogenously and estimating the
remaining parameters using a set of moments from the NLSY97. Those parameters that are set
exogenously are shown in Table 4, together with their values.
Externally Calibrated Parameters Both parents and youths are assumed to have a
risk aversion parameter, γ equal to 1.5. The interest rate, R, is set at 1.5%; the monthly
unemployment beneﬁt, b, is set at $500;42 and the monthly consumption ﬂoor is set at $100.43
The distribution of parental income is consistently estimated from the NLSY97 data in a ﬁrst
stage. It is discretized to a four-point distribution, reﬂecting average parental income in each
quartile.
The degree of economies of scale in the parental home, φ, and the costs of housing, χ, are
particularly important parameters since they determine the economic beneﬁts of coresidence.
Although there is some data in the NLSY97 on rental costs, it is missing for much of the sample.
The mean reported monthly rent for youths living away from home is $380, based on 253
observations out of a total of 1,416. This number is signiﬁcantly lower than what is suggested
by the 2001 American Housing Survey. For renter-occupied units with low annual household
income ($11,700 − $17,550), the median monthly rent is $601. In the model, χ refers to both
direct and indirect costs of housing such as gas and electricity, so I set its value at $650. At the
42Conditional on receiving unemployment beneﬁts, the mean and median monthly beneﬁts are $780 and $650.
However, in the model all youths are eligible for unemployment beneﬁts in all periods that they do not have a
job oﬀer. This is substantially more generous than in the US system, which requires that (i) a worker be laid oﬀ
through no fault of his own; (ii) a worker satisﬁes an earnings and/or employment requirement over the previous
year; and (iii) a worker collects unemployment beneﬁts for no more than 26 weeks. To partially account for these
diﬀerences, I reduce the mean amount in the data by around one-third to $500.
43Combining AFDC, Food Stamps and WIC, the median monthly beneﬁt for the NLSY97 sample is $220.
Because eligibility and take-up are far from universal, I set the consumption ﬂoor at half this value. Results are
not sensitive to other values in this range.
20estimated parameters, none of the allocations are signiﬁcantly changed when this is varied up
or down by 15%.
Unfortunately, there is not enough information in the NLSY97 data to identify the economies
of scale in the parental home, φ, based on observed choices.44 Since there is no consumption data
in the NLSY97 and the CEX only measures expenditures at a household level, I rather calibrate φ
based on information from household equivalent scales. I consider three of the most commonly
used-scales: the ‘OECD equivalence scale’, the ‘OECD-modiﬁed scale’ and the ‘square-root
scale’.45 For each equivalence scale I compute the percentage increase in income needed by
a household to keep welfare constant when moving from a household with two adults, to a
household with three adults. These three scales give values of 41%, 33% and 22% respectively.
Viewed through the lens of a static version of the model, these imply values for φ of approximately
0.2, 0.3 and 0.4.46 I set φ = 0.3, the midpoint of these values.47
Estimated Parameters The approach for estimating the remaining 15 parameters is to use
average moments over the age-range from 16.5 − 22.5. I choose moments that are suﬃcient to
identify all the parameters and discuss further which moments help to pin down which parame-
ters in Section 5.2. The full set of moments is shown in Table 5. Of these moments, the only one
that relates labor market outcomes to coresidence outcomes is the cross-sectional diﬀerence in
log earnings between youths living at home and away. This allows me to use the eﬀect of labor
market outcomes on coresidence dynamics as an informal out-of-sample test of the mechanisms
at work in the model.
The estimated parameters are displayed in Table 6 and include the labor market parameters





, the altruism factor,
η, the disutility of work, v, the discount factor, β, and the ﬁxed cost of moving out of home, κ.
These parameters are estimated using a simulated minimum distance estimator with a diagonal
weighting matrix.48 Asymptotic conﬁdence intervals are calculated using a bootstrap estimator
for the covariance matrix of sample moments.49
44With panel data on household level expenditures, one could plausibly use changes in consumption expenditure
when an additional member joins or leaves a household as a source of identiﬁcation. See Lise and Seitz (2009)
for an example of this approach using two-person husband-wife households. Identifying economies of scale within
households is a long standing research topic in applied econometrics, and one which is beyond the scope of this
paper.
45See Atkinson et al. (1995) for a comprehensive review of equivalence scales.
46Appendix F contains a detailed explanation of the mapping from equivalence scales to the weight on public
goods in the utility function
47In an earlier draft of this paper, I estimated a similar model under the two extreme assumptions of φ = 1
and φ = 0. The results were qualitatively similar although the quantitative ﬁndings were much larger with full
economies of scale (φ = 1).
48Estimates are not sensitive to alternative choices of weighting matrices, since all moments are matched well
in the estimation.
49The matrix of partial derivatives of the moment functions at the estimated parameter values is approximated
using numerical diﬀerentiation. Step widths of ±1.0e−7 are used and the reported standard errors are the average
of the standard errors resulting from the two sets of numerical derivatives.
215.2 Where Does Identiﬁcation Come From?
Whenever structural parameters are estimated on the basis of simulated moments, a question
of identiﬁcation naturally arises. Although it is not possible to provide an analytical proof
that the parameters are identiﬁed using a given set of moments, I address the question of
identiﬁcation in three ways. I start by following two approaches that are accepted as reasonable
in the existing literature. First, I examine a numerical estimate of the Hessian of the minimum-
distance criterion at the estimated parameter values and ensure that it is non-singular. Second,
I verify that the estimation strategy can recover good estimates of the structural parameters
using data that are simulated from the model.50 Finally, I provide an informal argument that
each of the parameters has inﬂuence on a subset of the chosen moments and give some intuition
for why this is the case. This approach should be persuasive, since it delivers an understanding
of why the available moments are suﬃcient to pin down the parameters. The inﬂuence of the
parameters on the moments is illustrated in Figure 5. Each ﬁgure shows how a selected moment
is altered when a certain parameter moves away from its estimated value, holding all other
parameters ﬁxed at their estimates.51 The features of the data that pin down the parameters
are as follows:
Disutility of Work (v) Conditional on values for the labor market parameters (see below),






Since this is a search model,
a standard identiﬁcation challenge arises as a result of the fact that rejected job oﬀers are not
observed. Identiﬁcation comes from a combination of functional form assumptions for the un-
conditional and conditional wage oﬀer distributions, and the structural relationship between the
disutility of labor and the reservation wage.52 The two arrival rates, (λ0,λ1), are identiﬁed from
the probability of working conditional on not working in the previous month, the mean duration
of unemployment and the probability of earnings changing between two months, conditional on
working in both months. The job destruction rate (δ) is identiﬁed from the probability of not
working,conditional on working in the previous month. Given the assumption of log-normality,
the ﬁve parameters of the wage oﬀer distributions (µ0,µd,µg,σ0,σ1) are identiﬁed from the
mean and variance of the distribution of earnings conditional on working, the distribution of
earnings conditional on having not worked in the previous period, the mean increase in earnings
50Both of these checks only suggest local identiﬁcation. To check for other local minima, a thorough search of
the parameter space was performed and while other local minima were found, none of these improved on the ﬁt
of the estimated parameters.
51The plots in Figure 5 only illustrate that each parameter is pinned down, given the estimated values of
the other parameters. They are intended merely to provide intuition as to which moments are important for
determining which parameters, and not as a proof of local (let alone global) identiﬁcation.
52Note that the distributional assumption on the wage oﬀer distribution is important for identifying the arrival
rate of oﬀers, since it determines the mass of wage oﬀers below the reservation wage. This is standard in estimation
of structural search models. See Flinn and Heckman (1982).
22conditional on an earnings change and the mean increase in entry earnings. The same diﬃculty
as in Flinn and Heckman (1982) applies here: it is the distributional assumptions alone that
make it possible to distinguish a model with low arrival rates and a small mass of oﬀers in the
bottom of the wage distribution, from one with a high arrival rate and more low wages. Hence
the particular method for discretizing the log-normal oﬀer distribution is not innocuous.
Altruism Factor (η) The altruism factor is identiﬁed by the average fraction of youths
that receive positive transfers from their parents in a given year. From equation (6) one can see
that an increase in the altruism factor leads to an increase in the marginal beneﬁt of transfers,
and hence a decrease in the asset threshold at which optimal parental transfers become zero.






The intercept and slope in the mean utility from in-
dependence, αz,βz, are identiﬁed from the average fraction of youths living away from home
and the growth in this fraction from age 16.5 to age 22.5. At the estimated parameter values,
the eﬀect of βz dominates. This is shown in Figures 5(b) and 5(c). The variance of preference
shocks, σ2
z, which determines the amount of heterogeneity in the relative preference for living
away is identiﬁed from the average diﬀerence in earnings between youths living at home and
youths living away from home. Recall from Figure 2 that the earnings of youths at home and





, then all coresidence move-
ments would be driven by earnings and asset accumulation, and youths living away from home
would, on average, have far higher earnings than youths living at home. As σ2
z increases, the
amount of non-labor market heterogeneity increases. This additional heterogeneity reduces the
away-home diﬀerential in earnings, as illustrated in Figure 5(d). However, the amount that σ2
z
can be increased is limited by the fraction of youths observed to live away from home, as reﬂected
in Figure 5(e). The persistence of preferences, ρz, is identiﬁed by the within-person time-series
variation in parental coresidence. Two moments are used: the monthly auto-correlation of cores-
idence outcomes and the fraction of youths who ever move back home at least once by the age
of 22.5 (see Figures 5(f) and 5(g)).
Fixed Cost of Moving Out (κ) The ﬁxed cost of moving has an asymmetric impact on
coresidence movements: its impact on movements out of the parental home is greater than on
movements back into the parental home. Hence, conditional on the auto-correlation of preference
shocks and the arrival rates for job oﬀers, I use the mean duration of spells back home alongside
the fraction of youths ever moving back home as the identifying moments (Figure 5(h) and 5(i)).
To see why this works, consider an extreme environment in which the ﬁxed cost is zero. With
no ﬁxed cost to moving out, the duration back home for a youth who moves back in response
to an unemployment shock will be similar to the duration of unemployment. The extent to
which spells back home are longer duration than spells out of work, identiﬁes the ﬁxed cost.
The amount that the ﬁxed cost can be increased is limited by the fraction of youths actually
23moving back home.
Discount Factor(β) The discount factor is identiﬁed from the mean level of assets at age
20.53 The extent to which assets are accumulated during these years, given the amount of risk
that youths face and the implicit insurance from parental transfers and coresidence, identiﬁes
the degree of impatience.
5.3 Results of Estimation: What Determines Living Arrangements?
The estimated parameter values for the baseline model are shown in Table 6. The ﬁt of the
model, as a function of age, is shown in Figures 6 and 7. In this section I discuss the parameter
estimates in terms of their implication for the determinants of living arrangements and transfers.
Preference Shocks and Coresidence Patterns The model is able to account for the
key coresidence patterns in the data, shown in Figure 6. The growth in preferences, βz, is best
measured in terms of the extent to which it accounts for the increase in the fraction of youths
living away home from age 16 to 22. When βz is set to 0, with all other parameters left at their
estimated values, the model generates 34% of the increase in the fraction of youths living away
from home. This implies that around two-thirds of the increase in the fraction living away is
due to an increasing preference for independence. The other third is driven by purely economic
factors: increasing earnings, employment and the accumulation of assets.
As discussed in Section 5.2, a large amount of heterogeneity in preferences, σz, is needed
to match the small diﬀerence in earnings between youths away and at home. This diﬀerence is
shown in Figure 6(d). Notice that the model is able to endogenously generate a gently increasing
age proﬁle of the away-home earnings diﬀerence, albeit not as strong an increase as that observed
in the data. The reason is as follows. At young ages, the only individuals who move out are those
with a very strong preference for living away from home (high z). To ﬁnance their strong desire
to live away from home, these youths lower their reservation wages and accept lower paying jobs
than youths who are living at home. This selection eﬀect generates a small away-home earnings
diﬀerence at the youngest ages. However, as the mean value of independence increases and
youths have time to receive more oﬀers and accumulate assets, the mix of youths who are living
away from home shifts to comprise those who have received more favorable labor market shocks.
The diﬀerence thus becomes larger at older ages. The high value for σz ensures that there are
always some low-earning youths living away from home, and some high-earnings youths living
at home, as is implied by the small overall away-home earnings diﬀerence in the data.
Next consider the auto-correlation of preference shocks, ρz. This correlation is estimated to
be 0.987 at a monthly frequency, which translates to an annual auto-correlation of 0.85. Thus,
although there is a large amount of cross-sectional variation in the relative preference for living
away from home (indicated by the high value of σz) there is much less within-person time-series
53Although partial asset information is obtained at other ages, the most comprehensive set of data on youth
assets in the NLSY97 is collected in the ﬁrst interview after the respondent turns 20. See Appendix A for details.
24variation in preferences. This implies that although non-labor market heterogeneity plays a
large role in explaining cross-sectional diﬀerences in coresidence outcomes, the labor market is
the key factor in explaining individual movements in and out of the parental home.
To illustrate this point, I decompose coresidence patterns in the benchmark equilibrium. I do
this by performing a standard within-groups/between-groups variance decomposition for cross-
sectional (a) coresidence outcomes; and (b) indicator variables for whether a youth moved in
or out of home. These decompositions answer questions of the form: How much of the fact
that one youth moved back home in a particular month, while another youth did not, is due
to the fact that they received diﬀerent histories of preference shocks?54 I ﬁnd that only 15% of
cross-sectional diﬀerences in coresidence are accounted for by labor market shocks. However, a
far greater fraction of movements in and out of home are due to labor market events: 38% of
movements back home and 50% of movements out of home.
An alternative way to assess the relative importance of the labor market and preference
for coresidence, is to compare the benchmark model with an alternate model where preference
shocks are shut down, but preference heterogeneity is retained.55 This is done by leaving all
parameters at their estimated values, except for the transition matrix for preferences, which is
replaced with an identity matrix. Hence individuals do not experience changes to their value for
z over time. I ﬁnd that without shocks to preferences the model generates 35% of the number
of youths who ever move back home, suggesting that labor market shocks account for around
one third of spells back home by this measure.
Altruism Factor and Transfers The value of the altruism factor that is needed to match
the fraction of youths receiving a positive transfer is 0.1. One area where the model fails to fully
account for the data is in predicting the level of transfers, conditional on receiving a transfer.
This can be seen in Figure 6(f), which shows that median transfers are much larger in the model
than in the data. However, for the reasons discussed in Section 2, this is to be expected: the
measured transfer amounts in the NLSY97 are likely to be far lower than the true transfers as














t denotes the entire history of preference shocks up to time t. The
ﬁrst term is the ‘between’ component: variation in rt that is due to cross-sectional diﬀerences in the history
of realized preferences for living away from home. The second term is the ‘within’ component: diﬀerences in
coresidence states that exist even within groups of individuals who have experienced exactly the same history of
preferences for independence. The fraction that is not accounted for by preferences, and hence is driven purely by
labor market diﬀerences, is that due to the ‘within’ component:
E[V ar(rt|zt)]
V ar[rt] . In order to calculate this fraction, it




, which is a high-dimensional object. To do this, two approximations are made.
First, the history is truncated after d periods. Second, I use a ﬂexible nonparametric estimator for the conditional
expectation, E [rt|zt..zt−d]. Note that the decomposition could also have been speciﬁed in terms of histories of
labor market shocks, w
t. The reason for preferring the decomposition in terms of preferences is that there is much
less history dependence in the eﬀects of z than w, for the reasons discussed in the text. The calculation is done
with d = 3, and the results are unchanged if a larger value is used.
55The hypothetical questions posed in this paragraph asks what would happen to coresidence patterns if the
stochastic structure for preferences were changed, and parents and youths optimally adjusted their behavior. In
the previous paragraph the question being asked was with respect to the outcomes that we actually observe -
what fraction of observed coresidence movements in the benchmark equilibrium are due to the labor market?
25implied by the model.56 A plausible interpretation of the diﬀerence between transfer amounts
in the model and the data is a measure of ﬁnancial support provided by parents that does not
come in the form of direct lump sum transfers across generations.
One reason for the high level of ﬁnancial transfers in the model is the homotheticity of
preferences that derives from altruism. This eﬀect can be seen clearly in the simpler static
version of the model in Appendix B. There I show that the combination of altruism and identical
preferences for youths and parents implies that transfers increase linearly with parental income
whereas in the data, transfer amounts are relatively ﬂat with parental income. To simultaneously
match the low levels of transfers, high fraction of youths receiving transfers and ﬂat transfers
with parental income, the model would need to be changed in a way that generated non-linear
Engel curves for parents’ expenditures on youths, such as diﬀerent curvatures of utility for the
two generations.57
Estimates of Labor Market Parameters All of the key labor market characteristics are
matched well by the model and are shown in Figure 7. The parameters that govern the degree
of earnings instability suggest that young males who do not go to college face substantial risk in
the labor market. There is a 2.4% monthly probability that a job is destroyed, which translates
to an annual probability of just under 35%. However, this is compensated by fairly high arrival
rates of wage oﬀers: around 19% per month when not working and 36% when working.
Other Parameter Estimates Expressed annually, the estimated discount factor is fairly
low: 0.92.58 This reﬂects the small degree of asset accumulation between ages 16 and 20 that is
observed in the data. Both the increase in average log assets, and the distribution of assets at
age 20, are well accounted for by the model and are shown in Figures 6(g) and 6(h). The ﬁxed
cost of moving out is estimated to be approximately $660, which is approximately one month’s
rent. Figure 6(c) shows that this generates a distribution of duration of spells back home that is
very similar to the data. Note that only the mean duration, rather than the whole distribution,
was targeted in estimation.
Eﬀect of Labor Market on Coresidence Dynamics The key economic forces in the
model are those that relate the labor market to coresidence dynamics. Yet the only moment
used in estimation that contains joint information on the labor market and coresidence is the
cross-sectional diﬀerence in average log earnings between youths living at home and youths
56The assumption implicit in the estimation strategy is that the data correctly report which youths receive
ﬁnancial transfers from parents in which years, but under-report the amount of such transfers.
57There are other simple changes to the model that would yield one extra parameter that could be used to
match the level of transfers in the data. For example, one change would be a simple iceberg cost of transferring
resources from the parent to the youth. However, such mechanisms are somewhat artiﬁcial and imply that parents
are extremely altruistic (to match the high fraction of youths who receive transfers) but that the cost of making
transfers is extremely high (to match the low transfer amounts). An alternative modiﬁcation to the model would
be to allow a negative correlation between altruism and parental income.
58Note that because of the low estimated discount factor for this group of low-skilled males, the eﬀect of the
form of the terminal value assumption on parameter estimates is minimal.
26living away from home. This leaves open the possibility of using data on coresidence movements,
conditional on labor market status, as an informal over-identiﬁcation test of the mechanisms at
work in the model. Table 7 shows the monthly probability of moving in and out of home by
employment status in the data and in the estimated model. The model does well in generating
employment eﬀects on the probabilities of moving that are of a similar magnitude to the data.
6 Putting the Model to Work: Coresidence as Insurance
In this section I use the estimated model to quantify the importance of parents in general, and
coresidence in particular, as a means of insuring shocks in the labor market. First, I deﬁne a
measure of insurance against shocks and use it to compare the value of the diﬀerent insurance
channels in the model, with respect to the loss of a job. Next, I compare youths’ consumption
response to shocks when they do and do not have access to their parents as a means of insurance.
I use these consumption responses to illustrate the potential for crowding out of private transfers
within the family by public programs.
6.1 Measuring Insurance Against Shocks
Consider a youth and a parent at the beginning of time t, after the realization of the shock
(wt,zt) for that period. Recall that the state variables in the MPE are xt = (at,rt−1,wt,zt,I)
with a corresponding value function Yt (xt) for the youth. I measure insurance as the degree
to which a youth is indiﬀerent between particular realizations of a shock.59 Focusing on job
destruction as a shock, deﬁne the diﬀerence in continuation values due to a job loss as
∆t (xt) ≡ Yt (at,rt−1,wt,zt,I) − Yt (at,rt−1,0,zt,I)
A youth is fully insured against a job loss if he is indiﬀerent between losing and not losing
his job, i.e. if ∆t (xt) = 0. When a youth is not fully insured, we can deﬁne the degree of partial
insurance, ξt (xt), as the compensating asset variation that is necessary to make him indiﬀerent
between losing and not losing the job:60
Yt (at + ξt,rt−1,0,zt,I) − Yt (at,rt−1,0,zt,I) = ∆t (xt)
ξt (xt) is the answer to the question of how much additional wealth we would have to give a
youth with state vector xt to make him indiﬀerent about becoming jobless.
Now consider a modiﬁcation to the environment that removes a particular insurance channel.
Denote the analogous continuation value diﬀerence in the resulting MPE as ˆ ∆t (xt). Once again,
59This deﬁnition of insurance departs from some of the existing literature by deﬁning insurance as equalization
of utility, rather than equalization of the marginal utility of consumption. I refer to this alternative deﬁnition as
consumption insurance and examine the consumption response to shocks in Section 6.3.
60An alternate (and equivalent) way to write this is Yt (at + ξt,rt−1,0,zt,I) = Yt (at,rt−1,wt,zt,I).
27deﬁne the extent of partial insurance, ˆ ξt (xt), as the compensating asset variation for the job
loss, but valued according to the value functions in the benchmark equilibrium:
Yt
￿
at + ˆ ξt,rt−1,0,zt,I
￿
− Yt (at,rt−1,0,zt,I) = ˆ ∆t (xt)
The reason for using the value functions from the benchmark equilibrium is that we want
to express the value diﬀerences in the benchmark and alternative environments using the same
units. However, since the marginal value of assets may diﬀer across the two equilibria, if we were
to calculate ˆ ξ as the compensating asset variation implied by ˆ Yt, we would risk concluding that
the utility loss from losing a job in one environment is larger than in another, simply because
assets are not very valuable in that environment.61 The way that ˆ ξ has been deﬁned, it will
always be the case that ˆ ξt (xt) = ξt (xt) whenever ˆ ∆t (xt) = ∆t (xt). We can then deﬁne the value
of a particular insurance channel against the loss of a job at xt as the proportionate increase in
the cost of a job loss due to removing that channel.
ωt (xt) = ˆ ξt (xt)/ξt (xt)
There are at least two types of beneﬁts to measuring insurance in this way:
Substitution of Independence for Consumption Measuring insurance in terms of the
smoothness of consumption is not appropriate (although I do this below, in order to connect with
the existing literature, which has largely focussed on this measure) since youths can adjust the
inputs to their own welfare (consumption, labor supply, independence) in response to exogenous
shocks. Consider for example a youth who moves back home as a result of a job loss shock.
This youth is unambiguously worse oﬀ as a result of the shock (since he could always have
quit his job), but his consumption may actually increase due to the public consumption in the
parental home, and reduction in housing costs. For this youth, the welfare cost of the job loss
is not realized through a drop in consumption but rather through a loss of independence. On
the other hand, if he were restricted from moving back home, he would retain his utility from
independence, but suﬀer a drop in consumption. ωt (xt) takes both components of welfare into
account, trading them oﬀ in the same way that the youth himself would.
Absence of Level Eﬀects An arguably more standard way of measuring the welfare costs
from the removal of insurance channels would be to simply compare the equilibrium value
functions in the two environments. However this comparison confounds two diﬀerences across
the environment - diﬀerences in the overall level of welfare; and diﬀerences in how welfare is
61Consider for example the case of removing unemployment insurance. Without unemployment insurance,
assets are particularly valuable: so even if the utility loss from losing a job is large, the amount of assets that
would be needed to compensate for the job loss may be small. Removing an insurance channel aﬀects (i) the level
of continuation values; (ii) the diﬀerence in continuation values between having and not having a job; and (iii)
the marginal continuation value of additional assets. The measure of insurance deﬁned in this section is designed
to measure only the second of these eﬀects.
28aﬀected by shocks. The insurance value of the change in the environment is only the latter
eﬀect, which is what ωt (xt) measures. This distinction is particularly relevant in this model,
since the presence of public consumption inside the parental home means that the removal of
the option of coresidence reduces the opportunity set for consumption. Even in a world without
shocks, a youth would be worse oﬀ if he could not live at home, simply because there is less
consumption available. The size of this eﬀect is directly linked to the level of public goods in
the parental home, determined by φ. However, in this paper I am interested in the second of
these two eﬀects: not the value of coresidence per se, but the component of that value that is
related to the eﬀects of other shocks (e.g. job loss, wages) on welfare.
6.2 The Value of Parents as Insurance
I use the estimated model to calculate the value of diﬀerent insurance channels for a typical 21
year-old male at diﬀerent parts of the parental income distribution. I consider a youth with
the median preference for living away from home and the median assets ($5,250) and monthly
earnings ($1,900) among employed youths with that preference for independence.
Median Welfare Cost of a Job Loss Table 8 contains the results of this calculation.
For each parental income group, the ﬁrst two rows show the welfare cost of losing a job in the
benchmark MPE. Expressed in terms of assets, the welfare costs of a job loss are around $10,000
and are relatively ﬂat across the parental income distribution. These welfare costs translate to
an immediate one-time transfer equivalent to around 6 months of earnings. This is consistent
with a mean unemployment duration of 6.2. The next three rows show how much these costs
are increased by the removal of insurance channels. Removing the option to move back home
increases the cost of a job loss substantially, but this eﬀect decreases as we move up the parental
income distribution. The value of moving back home as insurance, as measured by ω, is a factor
of 6.0 for a youth from the bottom quartile of the parental income distribution, and decreases to
1.1 for a youth from the top quartile. The main reason for these diﬀerences is that without the
option to move back home, wealthier parents compensate by increasing ﬁnancial transfers when a
youth becomes unemployed, while poorer parents cannot aﬀord to do so. So the insurance value
of being able to move back home is largest for those with the poorest parents, notwithstanding
the fact that the level of public consumption provided in the parental home increases as we move
up the parental income distribution.
Accordingly, the value of ﬁnancial transfers moves in the opposite direction with parental
income. Since youths with low parental incomes are less reliant on ﬁnancial transfers for insur-
ance in the benchmark equilibrium, removing this channel has only a small eﬀect on the welfare
cost of a job loss: virtually no eﬀect for those in the bottom quartile. However, for youths from
wealthy families, the cost of removing ﬁnancial transfers is large: a factor of 2.9 for a youth from
the top quartile of the parental income distribution. There are two contributing factors to the
high insurance value of ﬁnancial transfers for these youths. First, restricting transfers has the
29direct eﬀect of reducing their net income available for consumption. Second, restricting transfers
forces some youths from wealthy families to move back home upon losing a job, reducing their
utility from independence.
Summarizing the main ﬁndings, we have seen that for poorer families, coresidence is the
most important channel of insurance, while for wealthier families, ﬁnancial transfers are the
more important insurance channel.
Welfare Cost of a Job Loss By Earnings and Assets Figure 8 plots the welfare cost
of a job loss, ξt (xt), in the benchmark equilibrium and with each insurance channel removed, as
a function of the youth’s earnings immediately prior to the job loss. The four panels plot this
function for each quartile of the parental income distribution, again at the median asset level,
and express the welfare costs in terms of the number of months of lost earnings to which they are
equivalent. The relative position of the four lines illustrates the fact that the relative importance
of the diﬀerent insurance channels discussed above, is robust across the wage distribution. Figure
9 plots the same welfare costs as a function of assets, at the median earnings level. In all versions
of the model, the welfare cost of a job loss is roughly constant across the asset distribution. This
is because a job loss entails a lower utility loss at higher asset levels, but assets are less valuable
so more has to be given to compensate for the same utility loss. Figure 9 illustrates that these
two eﬀects approximately cancel each other out.
6.3 Consumption Response to Shocks
An alternative way to measure the value of insurance is to focus exclusively on consumption
ﬂuctuations and ignore compensating utility gains from increased leisure (and reinforcing utility
drops from the loss of independence). Much of the existing literature on insurance against labor
market shocks has followed this approach. In particular, Blundell et al. (2008) use data from
the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to measure the
extent to which household consumption responds to household-level income shocks in the USA.
Kaplan and Violante (2010) compare their ﬁndings with the predictions from a model where
the only mechanism for smoothing consumption is self-insurance through a risk-free security.
We ﬁnd that in such a world, consumption responds substantially more to income shocks than
in the US economy, particularly for young households and for households that are borrowing
constrained. In this section I provide some indirect evidence that coresidence may constitute
one of the additional mechanisms that young workers use to smooth consumption.62
Coresidence Improves Consumption Smoothing Table 9 reports the average percent-
62In this model household formation is endogenous and the focus is on individual-level consumption of the
youth, whereas in the CEX data, households are taken to be a ﬁxed unit and consumption is measured at the
household level. The results are intended to indicate that when coresidence is an option, consumption responds
less to shocks that if it were ignored. It is not possible to calculate corresponding individual-level consumption
drops directly from CEX data.
30age drop in consumption associated with a job loss. In the benchmark equilibrium this drop is
24%. When youths are restricted from living with their parents the consumption response from
a job loss in the resulting equilibrium increases by 8 percentage points (pp). This suggests that
coresidence has a signiﬁcant impact on the ability of youths to smooth consumption, through
economies of scale and savings on direct housing costs.
The same is not true for ﬁnancial transfers. When ﬁnancial transfers are restricted, the
consumption response to a job loss increases by only 2 pp. The reason is that removing ﬁnancial
transfers causes many youths to delay moving out of home, or to immediately move back home
upon losing their job, since their parents cannot provide direct ﬁnancial support. This means
that relative to the benchmark, the utility drop from the loss of a job is realized more through
loss of independence, and less through a fall in consumption.
Table 9 also reports how these drops in consumption vary across the parental income distri-
bution. Again, the importance of coresidence for consumption smoothing is most pronounced
for youths from the poorest families.
Coresidence Reduces the Consumption Smoothing Beneﬁts of Government In-
surance Does the presence of coresidence as a form of within-family transfers limit the value
of social insurance programs for young males? To answer this question, I compute the increase
in the consumption response to a job loss when the simple unemployment beneﬁts in the model
are halved. I then compare this increase with the increase in the consumption response when
the same experiment is done in a world where youths cannot live at home. If the increase is
substantially larger in the latter case, it suggests that recognizing the option to live at home can
alter our evaluation of the consumption smoothing beneﬁts of unemployment insurance. This is
exactly what I ﬁnd: reducing b by half in the benchmark equilibrium increases the average fall
in consumption by 3pp. However without coresidence, this reduction in unemployment beneﬁts
increases the consumption response by 9 pp: 3 times as much as when coresidence is ignored.
Hence ignoring the endogenous response of coresidence to changes in the level of publicly pro-
vided support may lead to overstated assessments of the consumption smoothing beneﬁts that
such support provides to youths.
6.4 Parental Support Distorts Savings Behavior
In this section I illustrate how the Samaritan’s dilemma (see Buchanan (1975) and Bruce and
Waldman (1990)) implicit in the model of altruism and ﬁnancial transfers distorts youths’ savings
behavior. The eﬀect is reminiscent of the ﬁndings in Hubbard et al. (1995), who showed that
the asset-based means-testing in the U.S. social insurance system provides a disincentive to
accumulate private savings and can thus help explain the low observed savings rates of households
with low lifetime earnings. For young people, the implicit conditioning of parental transfers on
youths’ assets has an analogous eﬀect. Thus the model is able to generate low savings rates for
youths without appealing to an unrealistically low discount factor.
31These eﬀects are illustrated in Figure 10 and Table 10. Figure 10 shows the age proﬁle of
average asset holdings in each quartile of the parental income distribution in the benchmark
equilibrium, and in the equilibrium with each form of parental support removed. First, note
that ﬁnancial transfers have a very large eﬀect on youths’ incentives to save in the top three
parental income groups. Table 10 reports that by age 23 average assets are 127% higher for the
top quartile when ﬁnancial assets are restricted. For the two middle parental income quartiles,
assets are 26% and 63% higher, while for the lowest parental income group (for whom transfers
are very small in the baseline equilibrium), there is no eﬀect. Note that coresidence plays an
important role in these counterfactual savings outcomes. When transfers are restricted, cores-
idence rates increase, particularly at younger ages, providing youths the means to accumulate
the precautionary savings that will compensate for the lack of future transfers.
Coresidence itself has two oﬀsetting aﬀects on youth savings. On the one hand, removing this
insurance channel generates a stronger precautionary motive for savings. On the other hand,
not being able to live at home leads to a large cost in terms of current resources, from both rent
obligations and the lack of public goods in the parental home. This makes it more diﬃcult to
save. For the higher parental income groups this second eﬀect dominates, and average assets
are lower when coresidence is restricted. For the lower parental income groups the ﬁrst eﬀect is
stronger, for two reasons: ﬁrst, youths from poorer families are more reliant on coresidence as
an insurance channel; and second, the amount of public goods that are lost from not being able
to live at home is smaller.
7 Conclusions
This paper started by documenting several new facts about the dynamics of parental coresidence
and labor market outcomes for low-skilled youths in the USA. I showed that the living arrange-
ments of many young adults are characterized by a transitional phase between adolescence and
adulthood, in which youths alternate between periods of living with their parents and periods of
living independently. These coresidence movements take place against a backdrop of substantial
labor market risk, at an age when minimal use is made of traditional insurance mechanisms.
By estimating the structural parameters of a dynamic model of the interactions between youths
and their altruistic parents, I showed that the option to move in and out of home is a valuable
form of insurance against shocks in the labor market, particularly for youths from low-income
households.
In order for the model to simultaneously account for both the cross-sectional and panel di-
mension of the data, two types of exogenous shocks were needed. The ﬁrst type was a stochastic
process for preferences that directly alter youths’ relative desire to live away from their parents.
The second type was labor market shocks, that take the form of the arrival of job oﬀers, job
destruction and productivity changes on the job. By exploiting the panel dimension of the data,
32it was possible to disentangle the relative contribution of each type of shock to coresidence out-
comes. It turned out that while the cross-section of living arrangements is determined primarily
by cross-sectional diﬀerences in preferences, labor market shocks are an important determinant
of the dynamics of movements in and out of the parental home.
This link between the labor market and coresidence helps to shed light on other important
aspects of young workers’ behavior. I argued that by reducing the consumption response to
labor market shocks, the option to live at home can help explain why young households appear
to have access to insurance possibilities over and above that implied by self-insurance through
savings. I also showed that through its eﬀect on the incentives to accumulate precautionary
savings, parental support can generate a plausible mechanism for explaining the low savings
rates of low-skilled youth.
At a policy level, the implications of parental coresidence are also potentially far-reaching.
The fact that living arrangements respond endogenously to the realization of labor market
shocks, suggests the possibility of substantial crowding out by social insurance programs. Since
many public programs are designed to insure against the same types of idiosyncratic labor
market shocks that living arrangements respond to, it is important to consider the impact on
coresidence when evaluating their welfare implications. Examples of policies that condition on
living arrangements include those that require means-testing at a household level (e.g. Food
Stamps Program) and those that link beneﬁt entitlements to the structure of households (e.g.
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families).
There are a number of important avenues for future research. First, endogenous household
formation may also play an important role as insurance for other subgroups. For example,
college-educated youths may use coresidence in a similar way once they enter the labor market.
Older workers may use the formation and dissolution of marriages and cohabiting relationships as
an insurance channel against individual-level shocks. Second, macroeconomics has traditionally
studied childhood and adulthood in isolation, as two distinct and separate stages of the lifecycle.
This paper suggests that there is an important transitional phase, where interactions between
housing, career and marital decisions may have long-term implications.
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Drop resp with 1998 interview missing 316 4283
Drop resp still in high school 740 3543
Drop resp observed in post-secondary education 1683 1860
Drop resp with gaps in coresidence data 21 1839
Drop resp who ever have all parents dead 21 1818
Drop resp ever in military 131 1687
Drop months at age < 16 1 1686
Drop resp with gaps in employment data 73 1613
Final sample 1613
Month/person observations 41406
Mean observations per person 25.7
Median observations per person 22
Table 1: Number of respondents lost at each stage of sample selection
Individual-level Fixed Variables Monthly Variables
Number Observations Number Observations
White 0.68 Age 19.46
Black 0.21 Away 0.35
Hispanic 0.15 Married 0.03
Age First Observed 18.18 Cohabiting 0.15
Age Last Observed 20.27 Working 0.71
Highest Grade Completed 11.47 Monthly Earnings 2196
High School Graduate 0.68 Annual Variables
Ever Away During Sample 0.53 Number Observations
Ever Home During Sample 0.89 Has Child 0.17
Move Out During Sample 0.38 Number of Children 1.25
Move Back During Sample 0.23 Receive Transfer 0.32
Ever In Jail 0.06 Annual Transfer Amount 974
Months in Sample 26.06 Characteristics of Parents
Number Observations
Number of Parents 2.25
Average Age 45.28
Biological Parents Married 0.46
Total Parents Income 56387













Table 3: States and actions for the non-cooperative game
38Parameter Description Benchmark
R Annual interest rate 1.5%
γ Coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion 1.5
b Unemployment beneﬁt $500
c Consumption ﬂoor $100
χ Monthly housing cost $650
φ Weight on public goods in utility function 0.3
Table 4: Parameters ﬁxed outside the model
Labor Market Moments Coresidence Moments Other Moments
mean, variance log earns fraction away from home frac receiving transfers
mean, variance log entry earns mean growth rate in fraction away age 20 mean assets
av growth mean log earns mean duration spells back home
av growth mean log entry earns fraction ever moved back
prob start work auto-correlation coresidence
prob stop work diﬀ: mean log earns, home vs away
prob earnings change growth in diﬀ: mean log earns, home vs away
mean log earns change
fraction not working
mean unemployment duration
Table 5: Moments used in estimation
39Parameter Description
Labor Market Parameters
δ Job destruction probability 0.024
(0.008)
λ0 Job oﬀer probability (not working) 0.191
(0.017)
λ1 New job oﬀer probability 0.364
(0.011)
µ0 Mean log wage oﬀer distribution 6.505
(2.151)
µg Growth rate of mean log wage oﬀer distribution (×10−2) 0.822
(0.085)
σ0 St. dev. log wage oﬀer distribution 0.540
(0.023)
µd Mean change log wages | wage change(×10−2) 0.758
(0.130)
σ1 St. dev. change log wages | wage change 0.352
(0.008)
Preference Shocks
αz Intercept for mean value of living away 1.065
(0.271)
βz Age slope for mean value of living away 0.602
(0.166)
σ2
z Variance of (log) value of living away 13.890
(1.441)
ρz Autocorrelation of (log) value of living away 0.987
(0.006)
Other Parameters
η Altruism factor 0.096
(0.041)
ν Disutility of work (×104) 0.963
(0.353)
β Monthly discount factor 0.993
(1.227)
κ Fixed costs of moving out of home (×10−3) 0.664
(0.150)
Table 6: Parameter estimates, standard errors in parentheses
Prob Move Back Home (%) Prob Move Out of Home (%)
Data Model Data Model
Overall 3.1 2.4 2.9 2.1
Working 2.8 2.1 3.0 2.2
Not Working 3.7 3.4 2.6 1.8
Diﬀerence −0.9 −1.3 0.4 0.4
Table 7: Monthly probability of moving in and out of home, by labor market status
40Quartile of Parental Income Distribution
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Cost of Job Loss, ξt
-Compensating asset transfer $11,100 $11,200 $11,900 $12,100
-Number of months of earnings 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.4
Value of insurance channels, ωI
t
- option to move back home 6.0 3.2 1.5 1.1
- ﬁnancial transfers 1.0 1.4 1.9 2.9
- unemployment insurance 1.7 2.0 1.4 1.4
Table 8: Cost of job loss and value of insurance for 21 year-old with median assets, earnings
and preference for independence. Value of insurance (ωI
t ) expressed as multiple of cost of job
loss (ξt).
Overall Quartile of Parental Income Distribution
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Baseline UI ($500 per month)
Benchmark 24 32 27 20 18
No coresidence 32 50 38 22 22
No transfers 26 32 27 23 21
Reduced UI ($250 per month)
Benchmark 27 33 29 27 18
No coresidence 41 47 57 43 18
No transfers 26 33 27 21 21
Table 9: Average percentage drop in consumption in response to loss of a job
Overall Quartile of Parental Income Distribution
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Average assets at age 23 $6,500 $8,300 $7,400 $5,900 $4,20
Change from baseline (%) (%)
No move back −8 9.8 −2.9 −21 −36
No transfers 42 0.2 25.9 62.7 126.8
No coresidence 4.1 9.1 4.9 −0.6 −0.5
Table 10: Average at asset holdings at age 23, expressed as percentage of age 23 average asset
holdings in baseline model.
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Figure 1: Coresidence statistics from NLSY97
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Figure 2: Labor market statistics from NLSY97
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(d) Mean annual parental transfers
Figure 3: Asset and parental transfer statistics from NLSY97
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z: growth pref shocks
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z: st dev pref shocks
(d) σz: Away-home log earns diﬀ
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κ: fixed cost of moving out
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κ: fixed cost of moving out
(i) κ: Fraction moved back
Figure 5: Relationship between selected moments and parameters, at parameter estimates
Notes: Blue dashed line shows point estimate, black solid line shows data. Red line shows how a particular
moment in the model deviates from the corresponding moment in the data as the parameter is moved away from
the point estimate.
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(h) Asset distribution age 20
Figure 6: Model ﬁt, coresidence, transfers and assets
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(c) Variance log earnings
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(i) Prob stop working
Figure 7: Model ﬁt, earnings distribution and dynamics




























(a) Bottom Quartile Parental Inc Dist




























(b) 2nd Quartile Parental Inc Dist




























(c) 3rd Quartile Parental Inc Dist


































(d) Top Quartile Parental Inc Dist
Figure 8: Welfare cost of a job loss in terms of compensating asset variation expressed as
multiples of monthly earnings, by monthly earnings.
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(c) 3rd Quartile Parental Inc Dist






























(d) Top Quartile Parental Inc Dist
Figure 9: Welfare cost of a job loss in terms of compensating asset variation, by assets.








(a) Bottom Quartile Parental Inc Dist
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(d) Top Quartile Parental Inc Dist
Figure 10: Age proﬁle of asset holdings, by parental income group.
49A Data and Sample Selection
The sample is drawn from the NLSY97, which is a longitudinal survey of 8,984 individuals from the cohort
born between 1980 and 1984. The survey contains extensive information on labor market behavior
and educational outcomes, together with detailed information on the youth’s family and community
background. Interviews have been conducted approximately annually since 1997.
Coresidence variables In principal, information about parental coresidence in the NLSY97 may be
obtained in two ways. The simplest way is through the household roster, which records the relationship
to the youth of all individuals living in his/her household at the time of the interview. However, using the
household roster as the basis for coresidence information has two problems. The ﬁrst is that it provides
only an (approximately) annual snapshot of living arrangements. This means that using the household
roster does not allow one to observe the circumstances that surround any change in living arrangements.
The second problem with using the household roster is that it does not necessarily correspond to the
current residence of the youth. Rather, it refers to the residence that the youth considers to be his/her
primary residence. For example, a youth who has recently moved out of home may report not living with
either of his parents but still report that his parents’ home is his primary residence. The rosters are thus
not reliable indicators of current residential status, particularly for youths whose coresidence status has
recently changed.
Instead, I focus on the set of retrospective questions about monthly coresidence that were asked in
rounds 2 to 6 (1998-2002). At each interview, these questions asked respondents to list each period of
one month or more in which they lived separately from each of their parents. A parent is deﬁned in the
NLSY97 as a biological, step, adoptive, or foster parent.
This speciﬁc wording of the retrospective monthly coresidence questions diﬀered slightly across waves.
The main diﬀerences are that in the ﬁrst 5 rounds, the respondent is given a list of each calendar
month since the previous interview, and asked about his/her coresidence status in each of the months.
However, in round 6 the youth is instead asked to report directly the calendar months in which changes in
coresidence status took place. For each parent ﬁgure, the youth was asked the following set of questions:
Rounds 2 to 5 (1998-2001)
Now I’m going to ask you about your parents and any other people you consider to be
parent ﬁgures. I will ask about each parent separately. My computer tells me that at the
time of your last interview, you were living [under joint custody/[blank]] with your [mother
(ﬁgure)/father (ﬁgure)] [name]. Was this information correct on [date of last interview] when
we had your last interview?
[questions are then asked about updating any changes in the parent’s characteristics from
the previous wage]
Are you currently living with [him/her] full-time, living with [him/her] as part of a joint
custody arrangement, or not living with [him/her] at all? Since [date of last interview],
has there been a continuous period of one month or more when you and your [mother
(ﬁgure)/father (ﬁgure)] lived in diﬀerent places? If you were temporarily away at summer
camp, but lived with your [mother (ﬁgure)/father (ﬁgure)] before and after that time, please
include those months as months you were living with [him/her].
Since [date of last interview] what months have you lived with your [mother (ﬁgure)/father
(ﬁgure)] at least some of the time? If you were temporarily away at summer camp or on
vacation, but lived with your [mother (ﬁgure)/father (ﬁgure)] before and after that time,
please include those months as months you were living with [him/her].
Now I’d like to ask you about parents and parent ﬁgures you weren’t living with at the time
of our last interview. Since [date of last interview], has there been a continuous period of one
month or more when you and your [mother (ﬁgure)/father (ﬁgure)] lived in diﬀerent places?
Since [date of last interview] what months have you lived with your [mother (ﬁgure)/father
(ﬁgure)] at least some of the time? If you were temporarily away at summer camp or on
50vacation, but lived with your [mother (ﬁgure)/father (ﬁgure)] before and after that time,
please include those months as months you were living with [him/her].
Round 6 (2002)
Since [date of last interview], has there been a continuous period of one month or more when
you and your [mother (ﬁgure)/father (ﬁgure)] lived in diﬀerent places?
Since [respar1dateﬁll] what month did you [resparent1ﬁrstnext] stop living with your [mother
(ﬁgure)/father (ﬁgure)]? What month did you [resparent1ﬁrstnext] start living with your
[mother (ﬁgure)/father (ﬁgure)]?
Was there another period of a month or more when you did not live with your [mother
(ﬁgure)/father (ﬁgure)]?
[this group of questions is then repeated in a loop...]
By piecing together the responses to these coresidence questions across rounds, it is possible to
reconstruct a monthly panel of parental coresidence outcomes for each respondent.
A youth is deﬁned as living away from his parents in a given month only if he is observed to be not
living with any of his living parent ﬁgures for the entire month. Conversely, a youth is deﬁned to be
living at home if he reports living with at least one parent ﬁgure at any point during the month. This
implies that only spells away from home that are longer than one month’s duration are considered to be
valid spells in the analysis that follows, and all spells back home will be recorded as lasting at least one
month.
Labor market variables Labor market variables in the NLSY97 are constructed from three sources:
(i) the employer roster, which records details about each job that the youth has held; (ii) the employment
event history, which is a weekly record of which employers the youth worked for in a given week; and
(iii) created variables for total hours worked in the week and hourly compensation for each job in each
week. The challenge is to construct monthly variables for employment, hours, and earnings from these
weekly data. To do this, I deﬁne a week as falling in a particular month if the start date was on or before
the 28th of the month (25th for February). This means that each month has either four or ﬁve assigned
weeks.
A youth is deﬁned as working in a particular month if he/she is recorded as working for at least one
employer during at least one week in that month. Monthly earnings for working youths are deﬁned as
52/12 times average weekly hours in that month, multiplied by average hourly compensation, where the
averages are taken across all jobs and all working weeks in the month. Where hours are missing but
wages are available and the youth reports working full-time, 40 hours are assumed. Some youths report
unrealistically high wages and hours. I deal with this misreporting by setting weekly hours above 100 to
100, and hourly wages above $75 to $75, in 2007 dollars. None of the results are sensitive to the choice
of these thresholds.
Asset data From round 4 onwards, information about assets and debts was only collected from
youths in the ﬁrst interview after they turn 20 or 25. This means that for the relevant ages in the sample,
asset information at age 20 is the most useful. However, in the ﬁrst three rounds, the NLSY97 collected
information on all independent youths. Having ﬁnished school, living alone or being 18 are each suﬃcient
to be considered independent. Thus, in the ﬁrst three waves asset data are available for all youths in the
sample. My measure of assets includes all ﬁnancial assets and vehicles less ﬁnancial debts and moneys
owed in respect of vehicles owned. Financial assets include businesses, pension and retirement accounts,
savings accounts, checking accounts, stocks, bonds. There is some top-coding in the data: the top 2% in
each category is set at the average of that group.
Tax function I use a tax function that includes three types of tax: payroll, federal and state. Payroll
taxes are comprised of two parts: (i) social security tax of 6.2% of annual income up to $102,000; and
(ii) Medicare levy of 1.45% of annual income with no limit. For federal income taxes I deﬁne net income
as gross income minus a standard deduction of $5,350 and a personal exemption of $3,400. I then use
the progressive tax rates for a single with no dependents for 2007 based on this net income. I assume
that state income taxes are 2.5% of gross income less a deduction for federal taxes plus another $2,500.
51All calculations are based on annual income, by multiplying the monthly income by 12 and dividing the
resulting tax bill by 12.
Sample selection The baseline sample restricts attention to youths who are never observed to
participate in any type of post-secondary education (Sample A). As discussed in the main text, to
address the potential concerns regarding endogeneity of the education decision, I also compare the results
from this sample with those from two alternative samples that implement the restriction to low-skilled
youth in diﬀerent ways. Sample B selects on the basis of low test scores, which are a strong predictor of
future college participation. This is done by retaining only youths who scored in the bottom quartile of
the combined Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, as constructed by NLS staﬀ. The tests were
administered prior to the ﬁrst wave, during the NLSY97 screening process. Hence, selection in this sample
is based on a purely exogenous variable, and there are no issues of endogeneity of education. Sample
C is less restrictive than the baseline sample. Rather than dropping any youth who is ever observed to
participate in post-secondary education of any type, I only drop youths who are “traditional” college
participants - those youths who start college immediately after graduating from high school, or within
one year of graduating. The purpose of Sample C is to retain youths who may attend college part-time.
The NLSY97 is itself not representative, due to an oversampling of black and Hispanic youths, as
well as non-random attrition. Hence, in all estimations I use a custom set of cross-sectional weights
to account for oversampling and attrition for the period 1997 to 2002. The weights are based on the
characteristics of youths who are present in all six rounds (1997-2002). See http://www.nlsinfo.org/web-
investigator/custom weights.php for information on the construction of customized weights for use with
the NLSY97.
B A Static Game
In this appendix I describe the structure and Nash equilibria of a static version of the game in the full
model with exogenous labor supply. Since this version of the model admits closed form solutions it is
useful to demonstrate some of the key mechanisms at work in the full model.
Consider a static version of the game in which youth income is exogenous, there is no ﬁxed cost of
moving out, there are no savings, φ = 1 (full economies of scale) and γ = 1. In this simpliﬁed version
of the game the only actions are the residential choice r ∈ {0,1} for the youth and the transfer amount,
T ∈ [0,Ip] for the parent. The wage oﬀer of youth, w, the income of the parent, Ip, and the utility from
independence are taken as exogenously given parameters. The payoﬀs in this game are given by:
Youth: Uy = log(gy + (1 − r)gp) + rz
Parent: Up = log(gp) + ηUy
with the following budget constraints:
g
y + rχ ≤ w + T
gp + T ≤ Ip
T ≥ 0
Note that when the youth lives at home, it is always optimal for the parent to set gp = Ip. Hence, the
payoﬀs can be written as functions of (r,T):
Youth: Uy (r,T) = log(w + T − rχ + (1 − r)Ip) + rz
Parent: Up (r,T) = log(Ip − T) + ηUy (r,T)
with T = 0 when r = 0. The assumption of log utility is not essential to obtain a closed form solution,
however it simpliﬁes the algebra.







p − w + χ]
52I assume that w ≤ ηIp + χ to simplify the algebra - this assumption just says that parental income plus
housing costs are much larger than the youth’s earnings. Note that this implies that T ∗(1) ≥ 0.
Best Response of Youth For a given transfer amount T, the youth will live away from home if
Uy (1,T) ≥ Uy (0,T) where
Uy (1,T) = log(w + T − χ) + z
Uy (0,0) = log(w + Ip)
which generates a reservation transfer for living away from home given by:
˜ T =
w(1 − ez) + Ip + ezχ
ez
where I have assumed w ≥ χ so that it is always feasible for the youth to live away from home and z > 0.
The best response of a youth is to live away from home if T ≥ ˜ T and at home otherwise.
Nash Equilibria There is a Nash equilibrium where the youth lives away from home as long as
T ∗ (1) ≥ ˜ T and a Nash equilibrium where the youth lives at home if ˜ T ≥ 0. Since T ∗ (1)) ≥ 0, a Nash
equilibrium will always exist, however it need not be unique. These latter Nash equilibria are sustained
by the parent oﬀering any transfer T < ˜ T if the youth is to move out. This implies that if T ∗ (1) ≥ ˜ T
there will be both an away equilibrium and a home equilibrium.
The payoﬀs for the youth and the parent in each equilibrium are given by
Uy (0,0) = log(w + Ip)








p (0,0) = log(I
p) + η log(w + φI
p)
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then both the youth and the parent prefer the












both the youth and parent prefer the home equilibrium: it Pareto dominates. In both of these cases, if
a timing protocol were speciﬁed then the sub-game perfect equilibrium would be the same regardless of
who chose ﬁrst. However, if z lies in the interval between these two thresholds, there is disagreement as
to which equilibrium is preferred. The youth prefers the equilibrium where he lives away and the parent
prefers the equilibrium in which the youth lives at home. If the youth were to choose ﬁrst, then he would
choose to live away and this would be the sub-game perfect equilibrium. However if the parent were to
choose ﬁrst, they would choose T ∗ = 0 and the home equilibrium would ensue. In this case the timing
the timing protocol does matter.
53C Markov Perfect Equilibrium
The MPE of the game can be described by a set of Bellman equations. Deﬁne Y m
t (xm
t ) and P m
t (xm
t )
as the expected discounted value along the equilibrium path at the beginning of phase m of the period
t stage game, for the youth and the parent, respectively. The four phases of the stage game, and the
corresponding state variable, xm
t , are outlined in Table 11. Optimal decisions for the youth and the
parent are denoted with an asterisk (∗).
Phase Conditioning Variables Choice By Whom Strategies Value Function
1 x1
















































t ≡ at, rt−1, rt, wt, zt, Tt, g
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Table 11: State Variables for Diﬀerent Phases of the Stage Game
The value functions for the youth are given in equations (8) to (10). (8) is the expected value at
the beginning of period t, before the current period shocks have been realized, (9) describes the discrete
residence decision, taking into account the equilibrium transfer strategy of the parent and (10) is the
labor supply and savings decision, which takes into account future values along the equilibrium path,




















































































1−γ − htv + rtzt and G = g
y
t + (1 − rt)g
p
t
Equations (11) to (13) describe the problem faced by a parent along the equilibrium path. Equation
(11) is the expected value for the parent at the beginning of period t, which depends on the residence
choice of the youth. Equation (12) is the optimal transfer and public good decision, which takes into










































































t)v + rtzt and G∗ = g
y∗
t (x4




There are a number of reasons why the MPE allocations may be ineﬃcient, relative to an environment
where parents and youths can commit at t = 0 to fully history dependent allocations. First, since parents
cannot commit to transfers before youths make their coresidence decision, there may be ineﬃcient delays
54in moving out of home, and ineﬃcient movements back home. Second, since youths cannot commit to
accept a job before parents make their transfer decisions, there may be ineﬃciently low transfers. Finally,
a version of the Samaritan’s dilemma is at work, whereby youth’s savings are ineﬃciently low because
they seek to raise their marginal value of resources in order to induce higher transfers from parents.
To examine how severe are these ineﬃciencies, and thus the sensitivity of the results to alternative
choices about how to determine allocations, I construct the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier between parents and
youths, at the estimated parameter values. I then look at the diﬀerence in welfare and allocations between
the MPE and nearby points on the Pareto frontier. For a given value for the youth, V
y
0 , deﬁne eﬃcient

























Due to the presence of altruism, there may be feasible values for V
y
0 for which this constraint does not
bind. In these cases, both the youth and the parent can be made better oﬀ by increasing the welfare of
the youth. Clearly such allocations are not Pareto-eﬃcient and so are not included as part of the Pareto
frontier.





0 + (η + λ)V
y
0 (15)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier that can be interpreted as a relative Pareto weight on the youth. Since
only the combined altruism factor / Pareto weight, η + λ, is important for determining allocations, the
assumption of eﬃciency alone is not suﬃcient for identiﬁcation of η. I construct the Pareto frontier by
ﬁxing η at its estimated value and solving the problem in (15) for diﬀerent values of λ.









parental income groups, and the corresponding value pairs (Y0,P0) from the MPE. This ﬁgure shows that
the actual ineﬃciencies in the game are extremely small. Note also that in the cases where the game
is eﬃcient, the MPE lies on a point on the Pareto frontier that puts essentially no direct weight on the
utility of the youth i.e. λ ≈ 0. If the game were indeed to generate eﬃcient allocations, then this would
necessarily be the case. To see why, it is useful to compare equation (6) that determines transfers for























Tjt = 0 if inequality is strict
It is clear that if the value functions in (6) and (16) are to coincide, then the only way that the game
could generate an eﬃcient level of transfers is if λ = 0.
Why Prefer the Game as the Baseline? If the ineﬃciencies generated by the game are so small
(and the game is more diﬃcult to compute), then why focus on the MPE, which requires additional
assumptions about timing and commitment, as the preferred model of behavior? There are at least four
reasons. First, the game is intuitive and generates some outcomes that appeal to introspection about the
nature of parent-youth interactions. For example, parents may make substantial transfers even though
they would prefer the youth to live at home. Also, parents can not control the labor supply and savings
of non-resident youths directly, but can only partially inﬂuence them through their choice of ﬁnancial
transfers. If a youth has a strong enough preference for independence, he will move out regardless of the
parent’s actions.
Second, the particular speciﬁcation of the game implicitly assumes that parents and youths cannot
commit to future decisions. This seems more in touch with reality than the assumption implicit in the
Pareto-eﬃcient allocations - that parents and youths can commit at age 16 to a full set of contingent
allocation rules for coresidence, labor supply, consumption and savings.


















Figure 11: Pareto frontiers for each quartile of the parental income distribution. Values for
parents include both direct utility and indirect utility from altruism.
Third, there is an important advantage of the game in terms of identiﬁcation of structural parameters.
Under the assumption of Pareto-eﬃciency, only the combined Pareto-weight and altruism factor, η+λ, is
identiﬁed, which makes it diﬃcult to use the model to do policy experiments and examine counterfactual
exercises. Only a locus of possible counterfactual outcomes are identiﬁed, indexed by how the estimated
value for η + λ is split between η and λ. The implicit bargaining weight, λ, may respond endogenously
to changes in the environment, an issue which is not of concern when using the game to determine
allocations.63
Finally, it is useful to be able to connect with the existing literature on parent-youth interactions,
which has predominantly used a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to model behavior. Games
with a similar structure to the one analyzed here are used in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1994), Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and Becker et al. (2008). However, note that in contrast
to the model in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994), I specify that it is
the youth rather than the parent who makes the coresidence decision. An exception is the static model
estimated by McElroy (1985), which assumes that cooperative Nash bargaining determines coresidence
outcomes.
E Numerical Solution of the Model
The model is solved by backward induction from the terminal value functions that are described in Section
3. The wage oﬀer distribution is discretized to a 9 point distribution, equally spaced in logs between $450
and $8000. The lower point is chosen to be 90% of the unemployment beneﬁt and the upper point is the
97th percentile of the observed wage distribution. The distribution of log preference shocks, log(z), is
discretized to a 7 point stationary Markov chain with second moments deﬁned by ρz and σ2
z. The grids
are then transformed to yield a distribution with mean αz + (t − 1)βz in levels. Value functions and
decision rules are solved on a grid with 16 points for assets and 7 points for public consumption inside
63If the eﬃcient allocations were implemented through some decentralized system, then λ would reﬂect the
implicit bargaining power given to the youth and hence the resulting point on the Pareto frontier. However,
depending on the details of the decentralization, changes in the environment may change the eﬀective value of λ,
leading to a diﬀerent point on the Pareto frontier being chosen. In the dynamic game, the assumption about the
timing of actions pins down the eﬀective bargaining power of youths and parents.
56the parental home. Linear interpolation (bi-linear interpolation for two-dimensional problems) is used to
evaluate values between grid points. The asset decision for the youth is solved using a golden search with
multiple starting values at each point in the state space. The discrete choices (coresidence, labor supply)
are solved by interpolating the choice-speciﬁc value functions at the relevant stage of the game.
Minimization of the simulated minimum distance objective function is performed using a trust-region
method for non-smooth non-linear least squares functions developed by Zhange and Scheinberg (2009).
The algorithm works by forming a sequence of smooth approximation to each of the moment conditions
being targeted. I use multiple restarts from many diﬀerent starting points in the parameter space to
ensure that a global maximum is found.
F Calibrating φ from Equivalence Scales
Consider the problem of a one-person household with Cobb-Douglas utility over two consumption goods,





g + c = I
Such a household sets g∗ = φI and c∗ = (1 − φ)I and obtains an indirect utility function V 1(I) =
φφ(1 − φ)1−φy .
Now consider a two-person household (which I will denote as p and y) with total income I. With a











g + cy + cp = I
The solution to this problem is to set g =
1+φ
2 I and cy = cp =
1−φ
2 I. The indirect utility function for





The value of φ that is consistent with an equivalence scale e is deﬁned as the φ such that V 1(I) =





Note that e(0) = 2 so that with no economies of scale, income needs to be doubled when moving from a
one-person to a two-person household in order to keep welfare constant. Similarly, e(1) = 1 so that with
full economies of scale, no additional income is required to keep welfare constant when a second member
is added to the household.
I consider the additional income required when adding a second adult member to a two-adult house-
hold that is implied by three commonly used equivalence scales. I focus on the addition of second adult,
rather than a child, because 17 to 23 year-olds are better thought of as adults rather than children for
consumption purposes. The OECD Equivalence Scale implies e = 1.41, the OECD-Modiﬁed Equivalence
Scale implies e = 1.33 and the Square Root Scale implies e = 1.22. Using the formula above that relates
e to φ, these numbers imply a value for φ between 0.20 and 0.42. I choose the approximate midpoint,
0.3.
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